An Iranian citizen requested international protection in Norway in 2011 on grounds of his fear of being persecuted by the authorities after participating in a demonstration in Tehran. The Norwegian Directorate of Immigration (UDI) rejected his application for international protection. The rejection was appealed by the applicant but rejected by the Immigration Appeal Board (UNE) in 2012.

Between UDI's decision and UNE's ruling on appeal, the applicant was baptised and participated in an introductory course on Christianity. Since his conversion was not assessed in the appeal, UNE re-evaluated the case, but it confirmed the negative decision. The applicant submitted a request for reversal of the decision, but UNE upheld the rejection of his asylum application in 2014. The applicant appealed before the Oslo District Court, which on 26 February 2015 rejected the appeal by concluding that the applicant did not risk persecution due to his participation in demonstration or due to his conversion to Christianity.

In 2017, the Norwegian Organization for Asylum Seekers (NOAS) became involved in the applicant's case and submitted a request for reversal of the asylum decision on grounds that the applicant was actively involved on missionary activities, but UNE rejected the claim as unfounded.

The applicant requested again international protection in 2019 and 2020, which were both unsuccessful.

The applicant appealed to the Borgarting Court of Appeal, which on 4 March 2024 ruled that there was no well-founded fear of persecution based on how the applicant would practise his Christian faith after returning to Iran. Moreover, it found that the applicant provided false statements on multiple occasions and submitted a forged document.

The applicant then appealed to the Supreme Court and argued that the Court of Appeal erroneously assessed the case and alleged that there is a difference in treatment of cases of conversion and cases related to sexual orientation, where the causal method is applied, based on a judgment Rt-2012-494, whereas the Immigration Appeals Board argued that there is no basis, also deriving from CJEU case law, to reach such conclusion.

The Supreme Court noted that the legal question in the present case was whether, in cases where it has been established that a convert will practice their religion discreetly upon return to their home country, the reason for this has any significance—typically whether such discretion  (the necessity of hiding one's faith) is due to fear of persecution or various forms of social pressure. The court assessed the situation of Christian converts in Iran to find out that there is an estimate of 300,000 to 1,000,000 converts and that conversion from Islam to Christianity is severely punished but conversion alone is rarely the sole reason for persecution. Non-leading members can face a lower risk compared to leaders and organisers of house churches, but they may still encounter serious social consequences.

The Supreme Court reiterated that an assessment of a well-founded fear of persecution due to religion, pursuant to Article 28 of the Immigration Act, involves both evidentiary and risk considerations, to determine whether there is a serious and realistic reason to feel fear.

The Supreme Court reiterated that the judgment Rt-2012-494 concerned an Iraqi national who requested protection on the grounds of being homosexual and the significance of the fact that homosexuals could avoid abuse if they adhered to prevailing religious and cultural norms in their country of origin. The Supreme Court held that if an applicant intended to conceal their sexual orientation upon return to their home country, and the reason for this concealment was the fear of persecution, then the requirement of a well-founded fear of persecution was met.

The Supreme Court found that three months after the judgment in Rt-2012-494, the Ministry of Justice issued an instruction according to which the method established represented a unique approach in Norwegian asylum law, that the issue was evolving in international law and the causal method should not be given a broader scope and used for other grounds for protection other than sexual orientation.

The Supreme Court considered that the assessment must be based on the wording, context and purpose of the Refugee Convention and that the causal method implied that no determination was made as to whether the fear of persecution was actually well-founded in the specific case. In this approach, the risk of persecution was no longer the central assessment criterion, but the reason why the applicant would restrict his behaviour upon return became decisive. The Supreme Court pointed out that if the causal method was to be applied to several grounds for protection, it would entail an extension of the right to asylum under Norwegian law. The court ruled that extending the causal method to religious conversion cases was not supported by existing law and that any expansion of asylum rights should be determined by lawmakers.

The Supreme Court referenced the CJEU judgment in Germany v. Y and Z (joined cases C-71/11 and C-99/11, 5 September 2012) which concerned two individuals belonging to a religious minority in Pakistan, who had practiced their religion openly in their home country and faced the risk of punishment and attacks from extremist groups. One of the questions was whether it is reasonable to require an asylum seeker to avoid the risk of persecution in their home country and the CJEU stated in paragraph 79 that "where it is established" that the applicant will practice a religion upon return "which exposes them to a risk of persecution," the applicant should be granted refugee status regardless of whether they "could avoid that risk by abstaining from certain religious practices." The Supreme Court further cited the CJEU judgment in X and others (joined cases C-199/12 to C-201/12, 7 November 2013), related to sexual orientation as a ground for protection. In that case, one of the issues was whether it could be required that an asylum seeker continue to avoid the risk of persecution by concealing their homosexuality, upon returning to their home country" (per paragraph 64). In paragraph 75, the CJEU stated that "where it is established" that a person's sexual orientation "would expose them to a genuine risk of persecution," it should not be considered that the asylum seeker "could avoid the risk by exercising greater restraint."

Based on the above CJEU cases, the Supreme Court noted that the authorities have to assess, based on objective and individual examination of the applicant's previous patterns of behaviour –the likelihood that the applicant risks persecution upon return. If it is "established," meaning sufficiently likely, that the applicant will behave openly and thus risk persecution in their home country, the applicant cannot be required to exercise discretion to avoid this risk. However, these decisions do not imply that asylum should be granted in cases where the applicant will behave in a manner that does not expose them to the risk of persecution. The Supreme Court dismissed the argument of the applicant according to which the new EU Qualification Regulation 2024/1347, which will take effect on 1 July 2026, might indicate a causal method, especially Article 10(3) because the court considered that the respective article will be a codification of the CJEU interpretation in Germany v. Y and Z. The Supreme Court mentioned that the ECtHR case law and UNHCR handbook and guidelines do not suggest that the causal method can be applied in cases such as the present one.

The Supreme Court concluded that when applying for protection on grounds other than sexual orientation, an individual and concrete assessment must be made of how the applicant will behave upon return. If the applicant - regardless of the reason - is not going to live in such a way that it triggers a risk of persecution, he or she is not entitled to protection under current regulations, but where the applicant is going to suppress a fundamental part of their identity or way of life in a way that is sufficiently serious enough to be characterised as persecution, protection shall be granted. Based on this, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal