The case was registered under C-596/24:

The applicant, a national of Syria from the Hama governorate, requested international protection, claiming that he fled due to the fear of being forced into military service by the Syrian government. The Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum (BFA) rejected his application for refugee status, stating that the applicant was not at risk of persecution, as he could pay an exemption fee under Syrian military law to avoid conscription. The BFA granted him subsidiary protection status and a one-year residence permit, and the applicant appealed this decision. He declared that he refused to pay the fee due to his political stance against the Syrian government under Bashar al-Assad, as he does not wish to financially support the government or the military apparatus under its control.

The Federal Administrative Court observed that Syrian Military Service Law permits Syrian nationals residing abroad to pay an exemption fee to avoid conscription, with the amount of the fee determined by the length of their residence outside Syria. Upon payment of the fee, individuals are exempt from military service and may return to Syria without the risk of conscription, though issues may arise at checkpoints if proper documentation is lacking. The court based its assessment of the situation in Syria on relevant EUAA materials such as the EUAA Country Guidance: Syria (April 2024), the EUAA Syria Country Focus (October 2023), and the EUAA Country of Origin Information Report – Syria: Targeting of Individuals (September 2022). It considered that the applicant faced the risk of disproportionate punishment upon returning to Syria, including imprisonment with torture or prosecution for refusing military service in a conflict involving war crimes. This raised the question of whether he can be expected to pay the exemption fee, available to Syrians abroad, to avoid such persecution. The court questioned whether paying the exemption fee can prevent an imminent act of persecution for conscientious objection, in line with the recast Qualification Directive (recast QD). If paying the exemption fee is deemed a valid means of avoiding persecution, the court must also examine whether this applies in the applicant's case, given his refusal to pay on the basis of his political beliefs. Additionally, the court highlighted legal uncertainties regarding when the option of paying the fee should be considered in determining potential persecution, and whether it can be deemed inappropriate due to Syria's legal context, particularly in light of EU sanctions under Council Regulation No. 36/2012, which may affect the legitimacy of paying the fee.

The court observed that CJEU jurisprudence held that for the payment of an exemption fee to be a viable means of avoiding persecution, it must effectively exempt the individual from compulsory military service, thereby eliminating the fear of sanctions for non-compliance. However, a key issue remained whether paying the exemption fee to a state engaged in a conflict where military service involves war crimes can be considered a means of avoiding participation in such crimes, as defined by Article 12(2)(a) of the recast QD. The court raised a concern that paying the fee could be seen as indirectly supporting the state's military, thus contributing to the conflict.  The court also doubted whether the fee might be considered punitive in nature. It referenced CJEU judgments in Andre Lawrence Shepherd v Bundesrepublik Deutschland (C-472/13, 26 February 2015) and EZ v Bundesrepublik Deutschland (C-238/19, 19 November 2020), which emphasized that conscientious objection must be the only way to avoid participating in war crimes, and they specifically address the issue of persecution under Article 9(2)(e) of the recast QD. The court noted that in the present case, the applicant was at risk of persecution. It held that even if the payment of an exemption fee could potentially preclude persecution under Article 9(2)(e), the same reasoning should apply to persecution under Article 9(2)(c), particularly if the fee would allow the individual to avoid torture or imprisonment. The court further questioned the reasonableness of requiring an applicant, who opposes the Syrian government for political reasons, to pay an exemption fee to avoid compulsory military service very military apparatus and conflict they conscientiously object to.

Moreover, the court questioned if the determination of whether an exemption fee can actually be paid should be made at the time of the judicial decision on the asylum claim, acknowledging that the Constitutional Court has also ruled that the ability to pay the exemption fee must be assessed at the time of the decision. The court raised concerns based on the CJEU's case law, which stressed that refusal to perform military service must be the only means of avoiding participation in war crimes. The court expressed uncertainty regarding whether this principle also applies to the assessment of the actual possibility of paying an exemption fee, particularly as this assessment could be influenced by factual elements no longer present at the time of the applicant's flight. In the applicant's case, for example, at the time of leaving Syria, the applicant had sufficient funds to pay the exemption fee, raising the question of whether this should be factored into the assessment, even though the circumstances at the time of his departure differ from those at the time of the court's decision.

Furthermore, the court raised doubts as to whether and to what extent the exemption fee in Syria, which Syrian nationals may pay to avoid military service, falls within the scope of Council Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 of 18 January 2012. The court questioned whether Syrian nationals residing in EU Member States are covered by the regulation, considering that Article 35(c) of the regulation states that it applies to persons who are nationals of a Member State, both “within and outside the EU”. The court also questioned whether payments made by Syrian nationals in the EU for an exemption fee are covered as "funds" under the regulation, given the broad definition of "funds" in Article 1(j). Additionally, the court highlighted that under Article 14(2) of the regulation, funds are prohibited from being allocated to entities listed in Annexes II and IIa. The court observed that, since the Syrian State and its Ministry of Finance are not listed in Annexes II and IIa, the payment of the exemption fee would not contravene the regulation; however, if the fee benefits the Syrian Ministry of Defense, which is listed in Annex II, such payment could be prohibited.

Therefore, the Federal Administrative Court referred the following questions to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling:

1.) Is Article 9(2)(e) of the recast QD to be interpreted as excluding the existence of an act of persecution if the payment of a fee, which is legally prescribed in a country of origin and would actually exempt a person from the obligation to perform military service, constitutes the only means of avoiding conscription?

1.a.) If Question 1 is answered affirmatively: Is Article 9(2)(e) of the recast QD to be interpreted as excluding the existence of an act of persecution where the payment of a fee prescribed by law in a country of origin would exempt nationals residing abroad from military service, provided that the payment of the fee is the only means to avoid conscription upon return to the country of origin, and the fee is calculated based on the number of years spent abroad (with fees of $10,000 for one year, $9,000 for two years, $8,000 for three years, and $7,000 for four years, with an additional fee of $200 for each additional year of residence abroad)?

1.b.) If Question 1 is answered affirmatively: Is Article 9(2)(c) of the recast QD to be interpreted as excluding the existence of an act of persecution where the payment of a fee legally prescribed in a country of origin would actually exempt the individual from the obligation to perform military service, and such payment constitutes the only means of avoiding conscription?

2.) If at least Question 1 is answered affirmatively: Are Articles 9(2)(e) and, where Question 1.b. is answered affirmatively, 9(2)(c) in conjunction with Articles 4(3)(b) and (c) of the recast QD to be interpreted as excluding the existence of an act of persecution when an applicant, within the meaning of Article 2(i) of the Directive, holds a religious or moral stance, or a political opinion, belief, or conviction that leads them to refuse to pay the prescribed fee?

3.) If at least Question 1 is answered affirmatively: Are Articles 9(2)(e) and, where Question 1.b. is answered affirmatively, 9(2)(c) in conjunction with Articles 4(3)(a) and 5(1) of the recast QD and Article 46(3) of the recast Asylum Procedures Directive (recast APD) to be interpreted as meaning that the assessment of whether the possibility of paying a legally prescribed exemption fee in the country of origin, which would exempt the individual from military service, excludes the existence of an act of persecution depends on the time of the administrative decision on the application for international protection, or the time of the court's decision on an appeal against the administrative decision regarding the application for international protection?

4.) Do the legal provisions of Council Regulation No 36/2012 of 18 January 2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria and repealing Regulation No 442/2011, as amended, preclude the assumption that the possibility of paying a legally prescribed exemption fee in Syria, which would exempt nationals residing abroad from military service, excludes the existence of an act of persecution under Article 9(2)(e) or (c) of the recast QD, when the payment of such a fee constitutes the only means of avoiding conscription upon return to Syria, and the fee is calculated based on the number of years spent abroad (with fees of $10,000 for one year, $9,000 for two years, $8,000 for three years, and $7,000 for four years, with an additional fee of $200 for each additional year of residence abroad)?

Note that on 17 July 2025, the CJEU ordered the strike out of this case, as the national court informed the CJEU “that, in view of the changes in Syria following the fall of the Assad regime and the development of the European Union's economic sanctions against Syria, it no longer intended to pursue its request for a preliminary ruling.”