The case is registered under C-389/24 [Daloa]

The Ordinary Tribunal of Firenze referred the following question to the CJEU:

Primarily, must EU law, Articles 36, 37 and 46 of Directive 2013/32/EU in particular, be interpreted as precluding a Member State from designating a country as a safe country of origin subject to the exclusion of categories of persons at risk, in respect of whom the presumption of safety does not apply, and must, therefore, in such a case, the country as a whole not be regarded as a safe country of origin for the purposes of the directive?

In the alternative, if that method of designation is not held to be prohibited absolutely by EU law, does EU law preclude a national rule that designates a safe country of origin with personal exclusions that, by number and type, are difficult to ascertain, given the tight time-frame of the accelerated procedure (in particular “prisoners; persons with physical or mental disabilities; albinos; HIV-positive persons; LGBT community; victims of discrimination on the basis of gender, including victims and potential victims of FGM; victims of trafficking; journalists”), and must, therefore, in such a case, the country as a whole not be regarded as a safe country of origin for the purposes of the directive?