LF, a third-country national who resided in Bulgaria for approximately 26 years, unsuccessfully lodged several applications for international protection and was the subject of several return decisions, which remained unenforced.

On 13 April 2021, LF lodged his eleventh application for international protection, claiming that he had lived in Bulgaria for a long time and due to the absence of legal rules on his stay in that Member State, he had not had access to health insurance and medical care and that his health prevented him from travelling normally and that long journeys endangered his life. This application was rejected by decision of the State Agency for Refugees (SAR) which held that the national authority responsible for returns or the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) would ensure his return to the country of origin. The decision was annulled by judgment in November 2021 after the applicant invoked the non-refoulement principle, which constituted a ground for granting humanitarian status. On 10 August 2022, the SAR adopted another decision in the case, by which it refused to grant LF refugee status and humanitarian status. The applicant appealed the decision before the Administrative Court of Sofia, which referred the following questions to the CJEU for preliminary ruling.

‘(1) Must recital 15, Article 2(h) and Article 3 of Directive [2011/95] be interpreted as allowing a Member State to introduce national legislation on the grant of international protection on the basis of compassionate or humanitarian grounds which bears no relation to the logic and spirit of Directive 2011/95 in accordance with recital 15 and Article 2(h) of Directive 2011/95 (another kind of protection), or must, in that case also, the possibility provided for in national law of granting protection on ‘humanitarian grounds' be compatible with the standards of international protection under Article 3 of Directive 2011/95?

(2) Do recital 12 and Article 14(2) of Directive [2008/115], in conjunction with Articles 1 and 4 of the [Charter], categorically compel a Member State to provide third-country nationals with written confirmation attesting that they are staying illegally but cannot yet be removed?

(3) In the case of a national legal framework whose only provision on regularising the status of a third-country national on ‘humanitarian grounds' is contained in Article 9(8) of [the ZUB], is an interpretation of that national provision which bears no relation to the character and grounds of Directive 2011/95 compatible with recital 15 and Article 2(h) and Article 3 of [that] Directive?

(4) Do Articles 1, 4 and 7 of the Charter require, for the purposes of the application of Directive 2011/95, an assessment of whether the fact that a third-country national has been staying in a Member State for a long time without a regularised status constitutes an independent reason for granting international protection on ‘compelling humanitarian grounds'?

(5) Does the positive obligation of a Member State to ensure compliance with Articles 1 and 4 of the [Charter] allow a broad interpretation of the national measure, namely Article 9(8) of the ZUB that goes beyond the logic and standards of international protection as provided for in Directive 2011/95, and does it call for an interpretation that is consistent exclusively with the observance of the absolute fundamental rights enshrined in [those] Articles of the [Charter]?

(6) Is the fact of not granting the protection provided for in Article 9(8) of the ZUB to a third-country national in the situation of the applicant [in the main proceedings] capable of constituting a failure by the Member State to fulfil its obligations under Articles 1, 4 and 7 of the [Charter]?'

The CJEU (Ninth Chamber) ruled that the recast Qualification Directive does not preclude a Member State from granting a right to stay to a third-country national for reasons which have no connection with the general scheme and objectives of that directive, provided that that right to stay can be clearly differentiated from the international protection status under the recast Qualification Directive.

Furthermore, the court held that, under Article 14(2) of the Returns Directive, a Member State which is unable to remove a third-country national within the periods laid down in accordance with Article 8 must provide that person with a written confirmation that, although staying illegally, the return decision will temporarily not be enforced.

Lastly, the CJEU held that Articles 1, 4 and 7 of the EU Charter, read in conjunction with the Returns Directive, “must be interpreted as meaning that a Member State is not required to grant a right to stay on compelling humanitarian grounds to a third-country national who resides illegally, irrespective of the duration of that national's stay in that territory. If the person has not been removed, he/she may rely on the rights guaranteed by both the EU Charter and Article 14(1) of that directive. Furthermore, if that third country national also has the status of applicant for international protection, authorised to remain in the territory of that Member State, he or she may also rely on the rights enshrined in the recast Reception Conditions Directive.