The applicant was initially hosted in a regular reception centre. On 9 March 2023, following disruptive behaviour, the Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (COA) transferred him to an Extra Enforcement and Supervision location (Handhavings- en Toezichtlocati, HTL) in Hoogeveen. Following this transfer, the applicant's behaviour did not improve. On 20 March 2023, the COA imposed an ROV (Reglement onthouding verstrekkingen kamer, Regulation deprivation of benefits in kind) measure on the applicant, restricting his benefits in kind for two weeks due to further incidents of threatening COA staff and destruction of property. This measure was extended by additional periods of withholding benefits in kind: from 3 April 2023 for two weeks and from 19 April 2023 for another two weeks. On 20 April 2023, the applicant left the HTL, but returned to the COA on 21 April 2023. After leaving again on 22 April, he returned to the HTL on 24 April 2023, where the COA imposed a measure restricting his freedom. Despite these restrictions, the applicant repeatedly left and returned to the HTL multiple times. The final departure occurred on 3 July 2023, after which he did not return or contact the COA.

The applicant challenged the COA's decisions and the restrictions imposed on him. On 16 February 2024, the lower court upheld the COA's decisions regarding the transfer to the HTL but found that the periods during which the applicant was placed in the so-called ROV room amounted to an unlawful deprivation of liberty. Both the COA and the applicant appealed this judgment before the Council of State.

In its assessment, the Council of State referenced relevant case law on the restriction and deprivation of liberty, such as: CJEU judgment in FMS and Others v. Országos Idegenrendeszeti Főigazgatóság (C-924/19 and C-925/19, 14 May 2020), which examined whether conditions in transit zones amounted to detention or merely restriction of movement; ECtHR judgment in Ilias and Ahmed (Bangladesh) v. Hungary (Application no. 47287/15, 21 November 2019), which considered whether asylum seekers had a realistic possibility to leave a transit zone; and ECtHR judgment in R.R. and Others v. Hungary (Application no. 36037/17, 2 March 2021), addressed whether prolonged confinement in transit zones, combined with inadequate options for leaving, constituted a deprivation of liberty.

The council acknowledged that transfers to the HTL impose significant restrictions on a foreign national's freedom of movement, but determined that these restrictions do not amount to a deprivation of liberty. It recognized that a transfer to a so-called ROV room entails even more severe restrictions, including confinement to a separate part of the HTL for two weeks, prohibition from entering general areas or using recreation rooms, exclusion from the day programme, and limitations to family visits only. Nonetheless, the council maintained that the transfer to a ROV room does not constitute a deprivation of liberty, as the foreign national retains the option to leave the HTL at any time. In support of this, the council noted that foreign nationals transferred to an ROV room have the opportunity to leave the HTL at any time. As a matter of fact, the applicant had previously left the HTL voluntarily without any adverse effects on his asylum process or reception. The council further clarified that leaving the ROV room does not impact the asylum application or constitute a criminal offense.

Regarding the duration of the stay in an ROV room, the council emphasized that the COA evaluates whether less restrictive measures could be imposed and that a minimum stay of one week in the ROV room is intended to restore order at the HTL following an incident. It noted that the time spent in the ROV room is not counted towards the maximum stay of thirteen weeks at the HTL, which means the total time a foreign national spends at the HTL could exceed thirteen weeks due to their placement in the ROV room. Nevertheless, the COA assesses whether continued placement in the ROV room remains necessary and explores alternative measures if repeated incidents occur. Regarding the degree of isolation in an ROV room, the council noted that the COA does not fully isolate foreign nationals from the outside world or other residents of the HTL. Consequently, the council found that there is still some level of interaction and access to external contact for those placed in the ROV room. It concluded that while placement in an ROV room involves significant restrictions on freedom of movement and limits access to facilities, the stay is time-bound and some level of freedom and contact is maintained. Foreign nationals can leave the HTL voluntarily without affecting their asylum procedure or future reception. As a result, the council determined that the ROV room does not amount to a deprivation of liberty, differing from the lower court's assessment.

Additionally, the council agreed with the COA's argument that the lower court misinterpreted the legal framework for transferring individuals to ROV rooms. Under the Regulation on benefits for asylum seekers and other categories of foreign nationals (Rva 2005), the COA can impose measures, like withholding benefits, for serious rule violations. The COA Measures Policy outlines how the ROV-06 measure should be applied for severe behavioural issues. The COA's argument that the lower court wrongly awarded compensation to the applicant for the transfer to the ROV room was therefore upheld.

The council upheld the COA's appeal, overturning the lower court's decision to annul the ROV measures and award damages. It also dismissed the applicant's actions related to the ROV measures as unfounded. Finally, the council declared that it had no jurisdiction to hear the applicant's appeal regarding the measure restricting his liberty.