The applicants are a father, a mother, and their six-month-old minor child. They applied for international protection in Slovenia and the Ministry of the Interior rejected the applicants' request because it deemed that Croatia was the responsible Member State for processing the application under the Dublin III Regulation. 

The applicants filed an appeal against the decision before the Administrative Court, which upheld the appeal and ordered the Ministry of the Interior to re-examine the case. The Administrative Court determined that the hygiene conditions in Croatia's asylum system, where the applicants were accommodated and were to be transferred to, did not protect the best interests of the child and put them at risk of inhumane of degrading treatment. In view of this, the court ruled that the Migration Department must ensure individual guarantees that the applicants would be accommodated in conditions that are at least similar to the Slovenian norms in terms of hygiene and baby care. In addition, the court noted that the Ministry of the Interior did not assess the best interest of the child, which must be ex officio considered in line with Article 15 of the International Protection Act and Article 7 of the Family Code. 

The Ministry of the Interior filed an appeal against the decision, arguing that the issue in question must begin with the concept of mutual trust that applies between Member States, and that only in exceptional circumstances there may be a deviation from this principle. The Ministry observed that the applicants indicated that they were accommodated for three days, had their own room, regular meals, and were provided with everything they needed to care for their child. The fact that the room was dirty, and they had to clean it did not constitute inhuman or degrading treatment, and the presence of cockroaches was a temporary issue. Given the applicants brief stay in the asylum centre, the possibility of leaving the room, and the fact that the authorities granted all their requests, the Ministry argued that it was impossible to conclude that cockroaches are a systemic problem in the asylum centre or that the authorities are unwilling to address the problem. Moreover, this issue has not been reported by the other applicants who are applicants in the Dublin transfer procedure and no European authority described the Croatian system as facing critical issues.

The Ministry further argued that it had no duty to investigate how the transfer procedure would impact the minor, since it was impossible to conclude that an hour of flight or two days car journeys may harm a six-month-old child. The Ministry contended that the Administrative Court entirely overlooked the fact that the child had endured a significantly more difficult journey when the parents crossed several borders. In response to the claim that it did not consider the best interests of the child, the Ministry stated that they were not required to do so, given the CJEU's ruling in M.A., S.A., and A.Z. v International Protection Appeals Tribunal and Others. Furthermore, the child's situation is intrinsically related to the position of his parents, and it is in his best interests to remain with them. As there was no dispute in the case that the parents took good care of their child, and given the proven factual circumstances, the Ministry argued that it had no need to further investigate the situation in Croatia.

The Supreme Court upheld the Ministry of the Interior's appeal, explaining that the principle of mutual trust applies between EU Member States, which implies that each Member State can believe, except in exceptional circumstances, that all other Member States respect EU law and fundamental rights. Moreover, in the framework of the Common European Asylum System, and in particular the Dublin III Regulation, which is based on the principle of mutual trust and aims to speed up the processing of international protection applications in the interests of applicants and participating countries, it must be assumed that the treatment of applicants in each Member State is in line with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights (ECHR).

The Supreme Court stated that a breach of the recast Reception Conditions Directive or the recast Asylum Procedures Directive is insufficient to demonstrate systemic deficiencies, but to rebut the presumption derived from the principle the problems must be demonstrated as systemic. The court noted that Member States are obligated to respect the fundamental rights of international protection applicants, and they cannot transfer an applicant to the responsible Member State if it is not possible for them to be unaware that the systemic deficiencies constitute reasonable grounds to believe that the applicant would be exposed to a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the EU Charter, which corresponds to Article 3 of the ECHR.

The Supreme Court remarked that the Administrative Court is incorrect in stating that the transfer to Croatia may only take place if the circumstances for accommodating the applicants are equivalent to Slovenian standards. The court held that it is not only a point of view that entirely ignores the relevance of the concept of mutual trust between EU Member States, but it also imposes, without a legal basis, an exaggerated criteria for the material reception conditions of applicants. The court highlighted that the recast Reception Conditions Directive establishes the minimum standard for the reception and care of applicants that must be met in Member States, with the goal of ensuring the comparability of the systems or rights that applicants enjoy. Differences in the sense of imposing greater standards are thus permitted, if not inevitable, but they do not preclude an obstacle in transferring an applicant. 

The Supreme Court further found that the minor's situation did not constitute an exceptional circumstance for which it could be concluded that the family's transfer would violate Article 4 of the Charter. The existence of cockroaches in the room where the applicants were accommodated was not in question; nonetheless, it was disputed that these conditions violate the minimum standards for accommodation that EU Member States must provide. The court ruled that the Administrative Court did not identify the duration or scope of the problem, nor did it specify the steps taken by competent officials to address the problem. 

The Supreme Court annulled the decision of the administrative court and sent the case back to it for re-examination as it deemed that the court of first instance used too high criteria for assessing the conditions for the reception of asylum seekers and that it did not sufficiently address the arguments of the Ministry of the Interior, consequently the relevant facts remained insufficiently established. According to the Supreme Court, only that would enable the assessment of the eventual risk of inhumane treatment. The Supreme Court also stated that the mere fact that one of the applicants is a baby does not in itself mean that the transfer to the Croatia would be contrary to Article 4 of the EU Charter, nor does it negate the principle of mutual trust. In this regard, the Supreme Court added that the court must take into account the subjective and objective circumstances of each case.