A Somali national, arrived in Sweden in 2017 and applied for international protection. In 2023, the applicant arrived in Ireland and applied for international protection in February 2023. Sweden was deemed the Member State responsible for processing the applicant's application for international protection under the Dublin III Regulation

The applicant requested for a deviation from the ordinary provision and the application of the discretionary clause under Article 17 of the Dublin III Regulation on medical grounds, claiming that if she is transferred, she will not be able to receive the necessary treatment and medication in Sweden.

In March 2023, the International Protection Office (IPO) sent Sweden a take-back request under Article 18(1)(b) of the Dublin III Regulation, which Sweden accepted. The IPO made a transfer decision in July 2023. In August 2023, the applicant filed an appeal with the International Protection Appeals Tribunal (IPAT), claiming that she would face a deportation order in Sweden, that reception conditions are poor, and that the IPO lacks authority to make a determination under the Dublin III Regulation. The IPAT found that it lacked authority under Article 17 of the Dublin III Regulation and could not consider this part of the dispute. The IPAT also ruled that Sweden was a signatory to the Common European Asylum System and other international human rights instruments, and that there was no real risk of refoulement, and thus the transfer decision was affirmed by the IPAT in February 2023.

In March 2024, the applicants lawyer applied to the Minister under Article 17 of the Dublin III Regulation. The submission contended that the proposed transfer violated the Dublin III Regulation as the IPO lacked the authority to make any determinations. The applicant further claimed that due to her medical condition, being transferred to Sweden would pose an increased risk to her health. She also cited the reception conditions for asylum seekers in Sweden, which she described as inadequate, and argued that she was at real risk of refoulement to Somalia.

In May 2024, the Department of Justice issued a decision under Article 17 of the Dublin III Regulation. The decision maker determined that they were satisfied that the material conditions did not disclose any humanitarian or compassionate grounds for invoking Article 17(1) of the Dublin III Regulation. The decision maker concluded that, as the designated officer, he had the authority to make the decision in accordance with the principles outlined in Carltona. He explained that he examined the Swedish regime and concluded that there was no risk of refoulement and no evidence that a deportation order had been issued to the applicant, whose case was to be decided in Sweden.

The officer further outlined some of the relevant case law and highlighted the applicant's lack of evidence regarding her actual circumstances in Sweden and any steps she took to apply for housing or financial relief, if necessary, or to appeal a refusal of aid or relief, if such applications were made and denied. The decision maker determined that the applicant was being treated for medical issues in Sweden and that there is no evidence that she would be unable to get medical care in Sweden, nor was there any evidence of a risk to her healthcare regime if she were to be transferred.

The applicant filed an appeal with the High Court, requesting leave to challenge the decision to transfer her back to Sweden as well as an order to prevent her deportation until the procedures were concluded. In addition, she requested declarations about the powers of the Respondents, and an extension of time because relief from one decision was sought ten days after the time limit had elapsed.

The High Court ruled that the applicant is entitled to leave to apply since the comparatively modest standard of arguability has been met in at least one component of the claim. In particular the High Court granted leave to apply for the following reliefs: 1) certiorari of the decision of May 2024 to refuse the applicant's request for a derogation under Article 17 of the Dublin III Regulation 2) certiorari of the decision of IPAT of February 2024 that the applicant be transferred to Sweden.

The High Court found that the applicant requested an extension of time to file her application, which was granted at this stage. The application in respect of the decision of the IPAT was ten days late but was made within four days of the last impugned decision, and, in those circumstances, the High Court was satisfied that it would not be fair to withhold leave in respect of the earlier decision when the applicant has sworn an affidavit confirming her intention to make the application and that she was advised to wait for the decision under Article 17, after which she moved quickly to request leave in these proceedings.

On the injection related to the request for suspensive effect of appeal, thus restraining the transfer, the High Court rejected it and determined that although the applicant had an arguable case allowing for leave to appeal, however it noted that the CJEU ruled in N.S. and others v Refugee Applications Commissioner, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform (United Kingdom), Joined cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 , ECLI:EU:C:2011:865, 21 December 2011 that it must be assumed that treatment of asylum seekers in all Member States complies with the requirements of the  EU Charter and the ECHR.  The IPAT and the Minister argued that the applicant did not submit any evidence to substantiate that the alleged medical condition could not be treated in Sweden nor that her conditions would pose an imminent danger to her health. The High Court assessed that the present case can be contrasted with the High Court cased in AHY v Minister for Justice (referral) where the applicant presented recent and strong evidence of suicidal ideation stemming from the impact on him on the proposed transfer to Sweden[i]. The High Court noted that the present case is similar with the High Court case in R.G v International Protection Appeals Tribunal & Anor, (19 December 2023), where a similar injunction was sought. It noted that the as dealt with the suspension of Dublin transfer and that the proceedings did not constitute a review within the meaning of Article 29(1) of the Dublin III Regulation because Ireland had already identified the body that carries out the appeal or review referred to in Article 27, namely IPAT. Such assessment was found to be in line the opinion of Advocate General Pikamäe and the CJEU in AHY, according to which there is no obligation under the EU Charter to provide for a second review, such as judicial review in this case.