B.F., a Lebanese national, requested international protection in Cyprus on 4 September 2018. The applicant claimed that he had been the victim of torture by the Lebanese intelligence agencies and military services due to his political activism and involvement in the paramilitary wing of a Lebanese political party. He added that he was subjected to threats and attempted murder, so he feared that if returned to Lebanon, he would be arrested and sentenced to imprisonment or the death penalty.

By decision of 7 February 2022, the Asylum Authority rejected his request for asylum, as it considered that there was no well-founded fear of persecution or a risk of serious harm if the applicant were to be returned to Lebanon. The Asylum Authority considered that the statements made by B.F. in several interviews were inconsistent, contradictory and vague.

The applicant appealed the decision before the International Protection Administrative Court (IPAC). The court noted that the allegations made by B.F. regarding the political, religious and racial persecution to which he was allegedly subjected by the intelligence agencies in Lebanon, lacked consistency, logic or plausibility. The court also added that the vulnerability of the applicant must be taken into consideration in the individual assessment of the asylum request, since vulnerability may affect the consistency of the applicant's statements and his/her credibility. The court observed that the Asylum Authority failed to carry out a medical or psychological examination of the applicant in respect of signs of persecution or serious harm which he claimed to have suffered, or to signs of torture or other serious acts of physical or psychological violence.

The court considered that, in the absence of a medical examination of the person concerned, it was impossible for the court to assess the applicant's credibility, which is an integral part of the full and ex nunc examination of the application which must be carried out by the court of first instance pursuant to Article 46(3) of the recast Asylum Procedures Directive (APD).

IPAC noted that, as the Supreme Court of Cyprus confirmed in its recent case law, under national law, IPAC does not have the power to order such a medical examination, and only the Asylum Authority has the competence to require an applicant for asylum to undergo medical examinations. In these conditions, the IPAC could only ask the Asylum Authority about the reasons why such examinations have not taken place and, where appropriate, it could annul the contested decision if there was an infringement of Article 15 of the national Law on refugees.

IPAC thus decided to stay the proceedings and made a referral to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling. The referral was registered before the CJEU under C-283/24 with the following questions:

1. Is Article 46(1) and (3) of Directive 2013/32/EU, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, and in conjunction with the obligation to carry out an individual assessment referred to in Article 4(3)(c), the duty of cooperation laid down in Article 4(1) of Directive 2011/95/EU and the duty of sincere cooperation laid down in Article 4(3) TEU, to be interpreted as meaning that, in the absence of an express provision of national law empowering the national court under Article 46 to refer the applicant for medical examinations, that court may derive its power to issue an order referring the applicant for medical examinations directly from that article where that is considered necessary for a full and ex nunc examination of an application for international protection?

2. Is Article 46(1) and (3) of Directive 2013/32/EU, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, and in conjunction with the obligation to carry out an individual assessment referred to in Article 4(3)(c), the duty of cooperation laid down in Article 4(1) of Directive 2011/95/EU and the duty of sincere cooperation laid down in Article 4(3) TEU, to be interpreted as meaning that, in the absence of an express provision of national law empowering the national court under Article 46 to refer the applicant for medical examinations, and, by extension, in the absence of an express statutory provision on a mechanism for referral for medical examinations available to the national court directly under that article, the court has the power to apply to the determining authority (which is always one of the parties to the proceedings before it) in order that it may, by analogy, implement the mechanism provided for in Article 18 of Directive 2013/32/EU by providing the national court with a medical examination of the applicant?

3. Is Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, to be interpreted as meaning that the means of conducting the full and ex nunc examination of an application for international protection are a matter for the procedural autonomy of the Member States? If so, is Article 46(1) and (3) of Directive 2013/32/EU, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, and in conjunction with the duty of cooperation laid down in Article 4(1) of Directive 2011/95/EU and the duty of sincere cooperation laid down in Article 4(3) TEU, to be interpreted as meaning that, in the absence of an express provision of national law empowering the national court to refer the applicant for medical examinations and, by extension, in the absence of an express statutory provision on a mechanism for referral for medical examinations available to the national court, the court has the power to apply to the determining authority (which is always one of the parties to the proceedings before it) in order that it may, by analogy, implement the mechanism laid down in Article 18 of Directive 2013/32/EU by providing the national court with a medical examination of the applicant where the national court considers that the national measures do not comply with the principle of effectiveness?

4. Is Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU, in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter, to be interpreted as meaning that, in cases where it is established that there is an absence of appropriate mechanisms for carrying out the individual, full and ex nunc examination provided for in Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU, the guarantees set out in those articles are satisfied where the national court has the power to annul the decision rejecting an application for international protection?