A Syrian national was granted subsidiary protection in 2017. Following a final conviction to a prison sentence of 3 years for causing dangerous bodily harm in 2018, subsidiary protection status was withdrawn in 2020 on the grounds of posing a danger to the general public. The Federal Office for Migration and Asylum stated that the offence committed showed that he had a complete lack of understanding for the freedom of action and self-determination of other people. The applicant appealed this decision to the Administrative Court, which revoked it, as it found that he did not pose a concrete and current danger to the general public with regard to future violations of legal interests within the meaning of section 4 (2) sentence 1 no. 4 Asylum Act (Asylgesetz). During the oral hearing, he credibly stated that he had never previously committed a criminal offence and that the incident in 2018 was a singular relational act.
The Federal Office applied for leave to appeal, which was dismissed by the Regional Administrative Court of Baden-Württemberg. The court explained in its decision the requirements for the danger. The court noted that according to the case law of the CJEU, the grounds for exclusion from subsidiary protection status are based on the regulations applicable to refugees, they are comparable in substance and are therefore to be interpreted in a comparable manner (CJEU, Judgment of Shajin Ahmed (Afghanistan) v Immigration and Asylum Office 13 September 2018, C-369/17 par. 43 et seq.). This meant that the "danger to the community or the security of the Federal Republic of Germany" on a systematic interpretation, must, like the other grounds for exclusion, also refer to expected criminal offences of "certain weight". Therefore, the court noted that the case law throughout Europe, usually confirms the exclusion ground of "danger to the community or to the security of the Member State" in the case of expected offences in connection with terrorism, homicide, drug trafficking or arms trafficking.
The court also recalled the relevant interpretation requirements of the CJEU regarding Article 17 (1) lit. b of the recast Qualification Directive, that ruled that a currently existing, particularly serious danger is always required in the specific individual case for exclusion from subsidiary protection. It was noted that it is not the past misconduct that is primarily relevant, but the future danger. Thus, a risk prognosis must be made as in the case of expulsion and the sole existence of an "abstract" or "general" danger which can hardly be assessed in the case of an individual cannot suffice for an exclusion of subsidiary protection. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.