The case concerned a family of Yemeni nationality. On 6 September 2022, the applicants presented themselves at the IND registration desk, provided information on their identity and expressed their intention to apply for asylum. They then received a so-called running letter (zogenoemde loopbrief), which indicated the upcoming steps and necessary information on time and location of upcoming appointments to apply for asylum. On 9 September 2022, the applicants signed the formal asylum application form (M35-H) at the police station. Because of an Eurodac match for Germany, the State Secretary submitted a readmission application to Germany on 7 December 2022 pursuant to Article 18 (1)(d) of the Dublin III Regulation.

With decision of 13 February 2023, the State Secretary for Justice and Security rejected the asylum application as inadmissible and ordered the applicant’s transfer to Germany. The applicants appealed against this decision before the District Court of The Hague on 7 April 2023, arguing that the time limit of three-month under Article 23(2) of the Dublin III Regulation had been incorrectly calculated, as the applicants had submitted the asylum application on 6 September 2022 when they were issued the running letter and therefore the time limit exceeded on 6 December 2022. The appeal was dismissed on the grounds that the applicants had lodged the asylum application by completing the M35-H form on 9 September 2022. The Court of the Hague considered that the running letter could not be regarded as a document issued by an authority. The applicants appealed against the decision before the Council of State.

The Council of State referred to its previous case law on the relevant starting point for calculating the Dublin time limit. Namely, in previous judgements, the Council of State had decided that the relevant point in time for calculating the Dublin time limit was the formal submission of an application for international protection using the appropriate form. In a later judgement, the Council of State held that it was sufficient for the applicant to lodge a document issued by an authority and which showed the intention to apply for asylum and that the document was received by that authority.

The Council of State court held that the running letter in question was issued by the IND and indicated the wish to apply for asylum, intention of which the IND was also aware. Therefore, a running letter could be regarded as proof that an application for international protection has been made. Based on the above, the court set aside its previous case law on this issue and decided that it must be assumed that an application for international protection within the meaning of Article 20(2) of the Dublin Regulation, at the time that the walking letter was issued.