The court ruled that:

Article 15 of the recast Qualification Directive “must be interpreted as meaning that in order to determine whether an applicant for international protection is eligible for subsidiary protection, the competent national authority must examine all the relevant factors, relating both to the individual position and personal circumstances of the applicant and to the general situation in the country of origin, before identifying the type of serious harm that those factors may potentially substantiate.”

Article 15(c) of the recast Qualification Directive “must be interpreted as meaning that in order to assess whether there is a real risk of suffering a type of serious harm as defined in that provision, the competent national authority must be able to take account of factors relating to the individual position and personal circumstances of the applicant other than the mere fact of coming from an area of a given country where ‘the most extreme cases of general violence’, within the meaning of the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 17 July 2008, NA. v. the United Kingdom (CE:ECHR:2008:0717JUD002590407, § 115), occur.”

Article 15(b) of the recast Qualification Directive “must be interpreted as meaning that the intensity of the indiscriminate violence occurring in the applicant’s country of origin is not capable of weakening the requirement of individualisation of the serious harm defined in that provision.”