The applicant, an Eritrean national, submitted an asylum application in the Netherlands. The Eurodac database revealed that the applicant had previously applied for asylum in Poland. The State Secretary for Justice and Security heard the applicant in a Dublin hearing about her stay in Poland. The Dutch authorities requested the Polish authorities to take back the applicant, but the Polish authorities refused since the applicant had been granted subsidiary protection. In a subsequent hearing, the State Secretary for Security and Justice heard the applicant about her objections to returning to Poland. 

The State Secretary for Justice and Security determined the application to be inadmissible since the applicant had been granted international protection in Poland. As a result, Poland is required to uphold its duties under international law in accordance with the interstate trust principle. Given that the applicant has a residence permit in Poland, it is appropriate for her to travel there. Insofar as the applicant had expressed reluctance to return to Poland, the State Secretary for Justice and Security determined that the applicant had not exerted sufficient effort to enforce her status-holder rights and has not provided sufficient evidence to support her claims.

The applicant challenged the ruling to the Court of the Hauge, claiming that the guarantee that she had been granted subsidiary protection was inadequate. In support of her claim that interstate trust cannot be assumed in Poland, the applicant cited information from the AIDA Poland country report, which, in her view, demonstrates that she will experience material deprivation upon her return. Moreover, the applicant argued that Poland is allegedly guilty of pushbacks. It further argued based on a judgment of the CJEU, that the judiciary in Poland is not independent, that she allegedly lacked access to legal assistance and interpretation (resulting into a wrong diagnosis at the medical consultation), she has not received any medical treatment, only a consultation with a psychologist. In addition, the applicant does not have any connection with Poland to warrant return and she has family in the Netherlands.

The Court of the Hague seated in Groningen concluded that the State Secretary for Justice and Security properly deemed the application to be inadmissible, rejecting the appeal. The court found that the Polish authorities had adequately demonstrated that the applicant had been granted subsidiary protection. Unless there is clear proof that the country to which the applicant will be returning does not uphold international obligations, and it is the applicant's responsibility to prove so, the court may assume that Poland, as a Member State of the EU, will abide by its obligations under the Refugee Convention and the Qualification Directive. 

According to the court, the applicant did not present specific information to support a different finding, and the applicant has the same rights as Polish nationals, in terms of employment and housing. The AIDA reported illustrated the potential for societal benefits and a strategy for integration. The court concluded that the applicant would not experience substantial deprivation as a result. 

Despite concerns regarding the independence of Poland's judiciary, the court determined that there was insufficient to support the judgement that the country is one where there is a genuine risk of inhuman or degrading treatment, as defined in Article 4 of the EU Charter. 

The court moreover found that the applicant had not provided evidence of any conditions in which it would be challenging for her to maintain her rights in Poland. Her alleged psychiatric problems were not further supported by evidence. The court held that the applicant's personal circumstances were unrelated to the preliminary questions following pushbacks in Croatia, about the divisibility of the interstate principle of trust, were asked by this court in a judgment of 18 March 2022, in the context of Dublin cases since the applicant had been granted international protection. 

In conclusion, the court determined that the State Secretary for Justice and Security had a valid reason to believe the applicant had a strong enough connection to Poland to allow for her return and all pertinent information had been considered.