K, a third-country national, arrived at Schiphol Airport on 30 November 2015 with the intention of flying to Edinburgh. During a document check before boarding, he was suspected of using a false passport and was detained. On 15 December 2015, the criminal court declared the criminal prosecution's action against the applicant inadmissible and ordered his immediate release by the next day. On 17 December 2015, K applied for asylum and by a decision on that day he was detained pursuant to the national provision transposing the first subparagraph of Article 8(3)(a) and (b) of Directive 2013/33 (Reception Conditions Directive, RCD), to establish K's identity and to obtain necessary data for the assessment of his application, as there was a risk of him absconding. The same day, the applicant lodged an appeal against the detention decision before the District Court of the Hague, arguing that Article 8(3)(a) and (b) of the RCD were contrary to Article 5 of the ECHR and to Article 6 of the EU Charter. In that context, the court decided to stay the proceedings and refer for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU whether the first subparagraph of Article 8(3)(a) and (b) of the RCD was valid in the light of Article 6 of the Charter.

The CJEU concluded after an analysis of such an article against the considerations of Articles 6, 52(1) and (3) of the EU Charter that there was nothing capable of affecting the validity of it.

First, the court noted that the limitation on the exercise of the right to liberty resulting from the first subparagraph of Article 8(3)(a) and (b) RCD is provided for by EU legislation, and it does not affect the essence of the right to liberty of Article 6 of the EU Charter. Furthermore, the court noted, the provision does not render the guarantee to a right to liberty less secure, as the power conferred on Member States enables them to detain an applicant only based on his individual conduct and under exceptional circumstances, which in turn must meet all the conditions set out in Articles 8 and 9 of the RCD.

Noting the observations of the Advocate General Sharpston, the court further held that a  measure based on the grounds in the first subparagraph of Article 8(3)(a) and (b) of the RCD met the objective of ensuring the proper functioning of the CEAS, allowing to identify person applying for international protection, and to establish whether they satisfy the conditions to qualify for such protection, to avoid, in the event that it does not do so, that they enter or stay in the territory of the European Union illegally.

Next, the CJEU evaluated whether the interference with the right to liberty was proportionate. The court ruled that such a measure, by its very nature, was able to ensure the proper functioning of the CEAS and contributing to the achievement of the objectives it pursued as, it allowed that applicants are available to the national authorities so that they are able, to interview them and, consequently, to contribute to the prevention of possible secondary movements. Thereafter, the court reminded that limitations on the right to liberty must apply only in so far as it is strictly necessary. In that respect, the court held that both from the wording and context of Article 8 of the RCD that such power is subject to compliance with a series of conditions setting a strictly circumscribed framework in which such a measure may be used.

Furthermore, the court held that the limitations on the exercise of the right to liberty contained in the first subparagraph of Article 8(3)(a) and (b) RCD were neither disproportionate to the aims pursued. The court held in this respect that in adopting the provision, the EU legislature struck a fair balance between, on the one hand, the applicant's right to liberty and, on the other, the requirements relating to the identification of that applicant or of his nationality, or to the determination of the elements on which his application is based, which are necessary for the proper functioning of the CEAS.