According to the summary provided by the EUAA Courts and Tribunals Network:

"The applicant, a Turkish citizen of Kurdish nationality, applied for international protection in the Czech Republic. He stated that in Turkey he would have to perform military service as according to the Turkish Constitution every citizen had to do so without exception. A refusal to perform military service resulted in criminal prosecution and punishment. The applicant was a member the religious movement of Hare Krishna and it was therefore against his religious belief to participate in the army. Moreover, the Hare Krishna Movement was not accepted in Turkey. In addition, people of Kurdish nationality were an oppressed minority in Turkey. The applicant was afraid that he would have to participate in this oppression as a member of the Turkish army. The Ministry rejected the application arguing, among others, the implausibility of the applicant’s statements in relation to his conversion to the Hare Krishna Movement.

The Supreme Administrative Court (“the Court”) ruled that the refusal to perform military service followed by criminal prosecution and punishment might be considered an act of persecution according to Art. 9(2)(e) of the Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (recast; “Qualification Directive”).

The Court also pointed out that it was up to an administrative authority or a court to deal with all the circumstances which came to light in the course of the proceedings and which might be relevant for assessing whether or not the applicant was at real risk of ill-treatment within the meaning of Art. 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (see judgement of the European Court of Human Rights in case F. G. v. Sweden, n. 43611/11). 

Finally, in order to rule that claims made by the applicant were not plausible it was necessary to assess the credibility of the applicant’s statement according to Art. 4(5) of the Qualification Directive.