This case examined whether the revocation of refugee status granted under the International Protection Act 2004 has retrospective effect. In particular, it concerned whether the Irish nationality granted to the applicant, U.M., on the basis of his father’s status as a recognised refugee at the time of his birth is still valid following the revocation of his father’s refugee status.

M.M. is an Afghan national who was recognised as a refugee by the Minister for Justice in 2006. On this basis, his wife came to Ireland under the family reunification process and later gave birth to U.M. in June 2013 in Galway. Following U.M.’s birth, M.M. was informed of the Minister’s intention to revoke his refugee status on the grounds that he had failed to inform the authorities that he had previously applied for international protection in the UK and that he had returned to Afghanistan for two months.

In February 2014, U.M. applied for an Irish passport and was informed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade that his request could not be processed as he was no longer considered an Irish citizen based on the fact that his father’s refugee status had been revoked. M.M. initiated judicial proceedings on behalf of U.M. in order to challenge the decision. U.M. and his mother also applied for international protection and were recognised in their own right during this time. This allowed M.M. to remain in Ireland on the basis of family reunification.

The High Court and the Court of Appeal both upheld the decision issued by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade.  

The Supreme Court examined two aspects. First, whether Section 6A of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956 required a parent to be legally present in Ireland for the periods of time specified in the Act in order for their children to be able to be eligible for Irish nationality. Secondly, the court examined whether Section 21(1)(h) renders a declaration of refugee status void ab initio or whether the revocation has a prospective effect.

The Supreme Court confirmed that the reference to residence in Section 6A of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956 referred to legal residency but differed in its interpretation of M.M.’s legal status at the time of U.M.’s birth. The court explained that there are situations where a person should clearly be considered a refugee up until their status is revoked, for instance in the case of a person who left their country due to fear of persecution but later returned to their country of origin following a change of the political regime. Revoking the person's status in this case would not mean that they were never a refugee or were not entitled to their declaration of refugee status. As such, a revocation of a declaration of refugee status on that basis could only have effect from the time of the events giving rise to the change of circumstances. In other words, the revocation of refugee status in such a case would have prospective effect. The court considered that if such a conclusion was applied to some of the grounds for revocation under section 21 of the International Protection Act, it should apply to all of the grounds listed under that section.

The court also noted that under the 2004 International Protection Act, the Minister for Justice has discretion over whether to revoke protection. The court further noted that a letter addressed to M.M., on 10 June 2013, spoke of the Minister’s decision to revoke “with effect from 31/08/2013.’’ The court concluded that this demonstrates that at the time the Minister intended the revocation to have prospective effect only. Moreover, the court highlighted that the discretion given to the Minister, enables the Minister, in an appropriate case to consider the effect of a decision to revoke on those who would appear to have obtained derivative rights prior to revocation. Taking that language into consideration, together with the language used in section 5 of the 2004 Act, the court concluded that while a declaration is in force, and until such time as it is revoked, it must be regarded as being valid.

In addition, the court highlighted that revocation of citizenship is prospective and not retrospective. This would mean that if the appellant’s father had through misrepresentation obtained Irish citizenship by naturalisation, and the appellant had become an Irish citizen by birth by descent pursuant to section 7(1) of the 1956 Act, the appellant would have remained a citizen even upon the discovery of the misrepresentation by the father and the revocation of the father’s citizenship. As such, if following the High Court and Court of Appeals interpretation, it was determined that the revocation of refugee status is always applied retrospectively, a legal anomaly would be created whereby providing false information to obtain refugee status would be seen as being worse than providing false information to obtain Irish citizenship through naturalisation.

Based on the above, the court allowed the appeal and confirmed that U.M. was entitled to keep his Irish citizenship.