The applicant is of Palestinian origin. He left Gaza and requested international protection in Sweden. His request for international protection was rejected and he was issued a return order. He subsequently lost his right to material assistance and was homeless for a period of five months. This case concerns whether or not it is lawful to transfer the applicant from Iceland to Sweden given that he had been issued a return order and no longer had the same access to reception rights.

The applicant left Sweden and requested international protection in Iceland on 6 April 2022. The same day, the applicant’s fingerprints were taken and uploaded to the Eurodac database which showed that the applicant had previously applied for international protection in Sweden. The Icelandic Directorate of Immigration therefore determined that Sweden was responsible for examining the applicant’s request under the Dublin III Regulation. The Icelandic Directorate of Immigration sent a take back request to Sweden pursuant to Article 18(1)(b) of the Dublin III Regulation which was accepted. The applicant was issued a decision stating that the material substance of his claim would not be examined in Iceland and that he would be returned to Sweden, on 22 June 2022.

The applicant claimed that the Directorate of Immigration did not adequately assess his return to Sweden in relation to Article 42(2) of the Act on Foreign Nationals and the principle of non-refoulement. The applicant stated that he would be detained upon his arrival in Sweden and returned to Palestine where he would be at risk from indiscriminate violence. The applicant further noted that it would not be possible to return him directly to Gaza and that he would be transferred to the Palestinian border and expected to cross and enter Gaza without assistance. The applicant asserted that he had exhausted Swedish judicial remedies and while he could submit an application to the ECtHR against the decision, he did not consider this to be a viable remedy.  

The Immigration Appeals Board analysed case law from the ECtHR as well as reports from various civil society actors and international organisations relating to the treatment of applicants for international protection in Sweden. Firstly, the board highlighted that the Swedish Immigration Act stipulates that foreigners held in detention centres should be treated with humanity and respect and that the standard of living in such centres ought to be comparable to those in traditional reception centres.

In relation to the principle of non-refoulement, the board noted that Swedish policies relating to returns were similar to those in Iceland. The board concluded that the procedure of the Swedish authorities provided sufficient guarantees, including an individual assessment, to ensure that no applicant is returned to a country where their life or freedom is at risk.

The applicant further noted that he suffered from discrimination in Sweden and was unable to access appropriate healthcare or reception. The applicant claims that he suffered from nightmares and other mental health issues as a result of the experiences in Palestine, being raped in Bosnia and living homeless in Sweden. The applicant states that he would be unable to access the psychological support that they require in Sweden as Swedish legislation has been amended in such a way that those who have received the final rejection of their application are no longer entitled to services from the Swedish authorities if the deadline for departure by themselves has passed. The applicant adds that, in general, psychological services in Sweden are not adequate for applicants for international protection.

In relation to healthcare, the board found that applicants for international protection are guaranteed access to basic healthcare services and those who receive a negative decision can access essential health care services until their departure. It is further noted that those with a negative decision are not entitled to financial support to pay for healthcare services or medication. In this regard, the board highlighted that the applicant was not considered to have a serious or life-threatening illness which would require treatment that was available in Iceland but not in the receiving state.

The board noted that applicants with a negative decision lose their right to housing but exceptions are possible in the case of vulnerable persons. The Immigration Appeals Board considered this information and concluded that while there was evidence of migrants experiencing discrimination in Sweden, the applicant was not automatically considered to be at risk of discrimination which was so severe that it would reach the threshold required to stop a transfer under Article 32(a) of the Act on Foreign Nationals.

The board thus concluded that the decision to return the applicant was legal and valid.