According to Yearbook decisions 2021:
The Finnish Immigration Service had considered that A had reasonable grounds to fear being persecuted in his home country of Iran within the meaning of Section 87(1) of the Aliens Act. However, A had not been granted asylum on the basis of Article 87(2) of the Aliens Act, based on the exclusion clause.
The Supreme Administrative Court ruled that, as an exception, the exclusion clause must be interpreted narrowly. Suspicion or speculation alone is not sufficient to exceed the threshold for evidence, but the authority must show that there are reasonable or serious grounds for suspecting that a person has committed an act within the meaning of the exclusion clause.
For example, membership in an organisation classified as terrorist does not automatically imply exclusion. Personal liability for the work referred to in the exclusion clause shall be assessed on the basis of individual factual facts, taking into account the threshold for the application of the exclusion clause. However, personal liability does not require that the person himself or herself has participated in, assisted in, or incited terrorist acts if the authority has established that the person is responsible for some of the acts carried out by the organisation during the period considered.
However, exceeding the threshold does not require that a specific act of terrorism can be established to which the person has contributed by his or her own actions. There may also be a reasonable suspicion of committing an act within the meaning of the exclusion clause, such as propagandistic activities relevant to the promotion of the activities and objectives of an organisation classified as terrorist or the recruitment of persons for terrorist activities.
A had been active in the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and organisations under its authority for several years. It could be considered obvious that he had been aware of the PKK's policies and therefore of acts considered terrorism in the organisation's activities. For clarification purposes, the Supreme Administrative Court also ruled that acts of terrorist nature characterised by violence against the civilian population must be regarded as serious non-political crimes within the meaning of the exclusion clause, even if they are claimed to have a political objective.
However, A had not held a managerial or managerial position in the organisations concerned, nor could his position be considered particularly important on other grounds. His work was focused on informing the organisation, which in itself could be considered to have contributed to the organisation's activities and objectives. However, it was not possible for him, on the basis of information and translation alone, to be judged personally responsible for acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations by the PKK fighters. Moreover, A's personal responsibility for terrorist acts could not be considered to have arisen on the grounds that he had passed on information about the organisation and his accession to the organisation. In that regard, it had to be found to be speculative that persons had joined the organisation as a result of his activities and that such persons subsequently committed acts within the meaning of the exclusion clause. Moreover, it had not been suggested that A had incited or otherwise participated in acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations by the PKK or the Iranian Kurdish Organisation (PJAK). Given A's status and duties, he could not be held personally responsible for the terrorist acts carried out.
The Supreme Administrative Court upheld the Administrative Court decision of annulling the FIS decision regarding the exclusion clause and referred the case back to FIS for review.