P.G., an Iraqi Kurd national, applied for asylum in a transit zone of Hungary on 22 August 2017. On 14 March 2018, the Hungarian authorities rejected his request and declared the principle of non-refoulement inapplicable to him. He was issued with return measure and two-year residence entry ban. P.G. appealed before the Administrative and Labour Court in Budapest against the rejection decision. The Administrative and Labour Court in Budapest decided to stay the domestic proceedings and refer for preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union two questions.

The first question concerned whether Article 46(3) of the recast Asylum Procedures Directive  (APD)(Directive 2013/32), read in the light of Article 47 of the EU Charter, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which confers solely on courts or tribunals the power to annul decisions of the competent authorities in matters of international protection but excludes them from amending such decisions.

The CJEU indicated at the outset that it had answered to the question in the cases of Alheto (C-585/16, 25 July 2018) and Torubarov (C-556/17, 29 July 2019). Applying the principles of these cases to the case at hand, the court concluded in the affirmative however it noted that if the file is referred to the competent administrative authority, a new decision should be adopted within a short period of time and in compliance with the assessment contained in the judgment annulling the decision. 

Moreover, the court held that, where a national court has found — after making a full and ex nunc examination— that, under the criteria laid down by the recast QD, the applicant concerned must be granted protection on the ground that he or she relied on in support of his or her application, but after which the administrative authority adopts a contrary decision without establishing that new elements have arisen that justify a new assessment of the international protection needs of the applicant, that court must, where national law does not provide it with any means of ensuring that its judgment is complied with, amend that decision which does not comply with its previous judgment and substitute its own decision for it as to the application for international protection, by disapplying, if necessary, the national law that prohibits it from proceeding in that way.

The second question concerned whether Article 46(3) of the recast APD, read in the light of Article 47 of the EU Charter, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which sets a period of 60 days within which a court hearing an appeal against a decision rejecting an application for international protection must adjudicate.

The CJEU noted at the outset that the recast APD does not lay down harmonised rules on time limits for judgment, and it authorises the Member States to lay down such time limits in Article 46 (10). It recalled that, in the absence EU rules on the matter, the rules established within the national legal order must comply with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. Furthermore, the court recalled the importance that every decision on international protection needs must be based on an individual assessment and highlighted that, in the context of a judicial remedy, a certain number of specific procedural rights are guaranteed to applicants such as the right to an interpreter, the possibility of communicating inter alia, with the UNHCR, and access to certain information that is, the possibility of legal assistance and accessing to free legal representation. 

The CJEU ruled that in the absence of any national rule intended to ensure that the case is heard within a reasonable period, such as a rule providing that, at the end of the 60-day period, the file is to be assigned to another court, the principle of effectiveness of EU law implied an obligation on the part of the court to disapply the national legislation which considers it to be mandatory. However, the court held that such obligation cannot relieve the court of all obligation to act expeditiously but merely requires it to consider the period given to it as indicative, it being for it to give a ruling as quickly as possible if that period is exceeded.

Based on these considerations, the CJEU concluded that Article 46(3) recast APD read in light of Article 47 of the EU Charter must be interpreted not to preclude national legislation setting a period of 60 days for a court to decide on an appeal against a rejection decision, provided that that court is able to ensure, within that period, that the substantive and procedural rules which EU law affords to the applicant are effective. If that is not the case, that court must disapply the national legislation laying down the period for adjudication and, once that period has elapsed, deliver its judgment as promptly as possible.