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The applicant, a stateless Palestinian, member of Sunni religious community, applied for international protection on 25 April 2022. He claimed to have fled his country because of the war and because he was requested by the Liwa al-Quds to join them (Syrian regime) since the beginning of the war, but he refused because he was the only son in the family, he had to care for his family and should not go to military service. His application for asylum was rejected but he was granted subsidiary protection and a one-year residence on grounds that the security situation in Syria is unsafe and there was a real danger to him as a civilian and thus an obstacle to return within the meaning of Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR.

In the appeal before the Federal Administrative Court, the applicant contested the negative decision on his asylum claim. The court noted that the applicant The BF, his wife and children are registered as refugees with the UN Relief and Works Organization for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). The BF and his family also made use of UNRWA's services in the form of housing, food and cash payments.

The court made a comprehensive analysis of the country of origin situation and cited the EASO COI Meeting Report - Syria March 2018, the EASO COI Syria Military Service April 2021, and the EASO COI: Syria: Situation of returnees from abroad, June 2021.

With regard to credibility of statements, the court noted that in the course of first instance procedure, although the applicant was informed that his information was an essential basis for the decision in the asylum procedure, however he was unable to substantiate his claim on an individual persecution based on conscription. The court noted that the applicant provided divergent statements in the hearing and in the personal interview about the risk of forced recruitment, by changing the statements from a risk due to general security situation to recruitment attempts by the Liwa al-Quds that hit him personally. The court noted that the applicant made diverging statements, the fact that he was undisturbed by the militia and that he, as the only son in the family, could be exempted from military service/ The court concluded that the applicant he did not substantiate his claim and did not demonstrate in a credible manner that he has an individual fear of persecution.

However, the court subsequently considered the application of Article 1 (D) of the Refugee Convention and found that the applicant falls within the scope of Article 1D since he is from Syria and is registered as a Palestinian refugee with UNRWA in Syria. The court reiterated that those who fall under Article 1D are generally excluded from refugee protection unless it is established that this protection "is not or no longer granted for any reason", which in turn would have the consequence that the person would "ipso facto" be granted refugee status. The court reference to the CJEU judgment El Kott to state that the reasons for having left UNRWA's area of operation, and thus a loss of UNRWA's protection, do not depend on the existence of individual persecution within the meaning of Article 1(A) of the Genera Convention, but a person could have left if she or he was in a very precarious personal situation and it is impossible for UNRWA to guarantee him or her living conditions in that area, which are consistent with the task assigned to it. The court concluded that the applicant must be granted asylum  "ipso facto", since although he was granted UNRWA assistance in the past, it is now no longer available for "reasons beyond his control and independent of his will" and he is also not entitled to benefits in any other UNRWA area of operations. Also, the court stated that BF had previously only lived in UNRWA's Syria area of operations and referred to the CJEU judgement in Federal Republic of Germany v XT since it is not evident that applicant could or can have entered another area of operations in UNRWA's area of operation, where the organisation is able to offer him its protection and assistance and to stay there in safety.

The applicant, a woman from Tunisia, requested international protection, and her application was rejected by the Territorial Commission of Rome as manifestly unfounded. She challenged this decision, arguing that Tunisia was not safe for her due to personal experiences of gender-based violence and the ineffective implementation of protective laws.

During her personal interview, the applicant detailed her experiences of domestic violence. In 2015, after a divorce, she returned to live with her mother. Following her father’s death in March 2019, her mother remarried, and her new stepfather subjected her to both physical and sexual abuse. Despite making several attempts to seek assistance from local authorities and women’s rights organisations, the applicant reported inadequate protection and disbelief from both her mother and the authorities.

The court's assessment involved a thorough review of relevant COI, which highlighted systemic issues in Tunisia regarding the protection of women. Despite Tunisia's legal provisions addressing gender-based violence, such as Organic Law No. 58 on the Elimination of Violence against Women, the court observed significant gaps in their practical implementation. Indeed, COI documented persistent shortcomings in the implementation of the law, including inadequate police response, a lack of trained personnel, insufficient state funding, and the widespread societal stigma surrounding domestic violence. This indicated that Tunisia's legal provisions were undermined by a lack of resources and systemic issues within the judicial and enforcement systems.

In examining the applicant’s case, the court analysed both the credibility of her claims and the broader context of the situation in Tunisia. It recognized the applicant’s personal experiences of severe abuse, including physical and sexual violence, as a critical factor in assessing the safety conditions in her country of origin. The court also addressed the inconsistency noted by the Territorial Commission regarding the applicant’s attempts to seek help. Despite initial doubts raised by the Commission about the applicant’s engagement with local authorities and women’s rights organizations, the court found that the applicant’s efforts to obtain protection were credible. The fact that the authorities did not follow up or provide her adequate support confirmed the systemic failures in Tunisia’s protective mechanisms. The court emphasised that while Tunisia’s constitution and laws nominally protect women, the practical implementation falls significantly short. This lack of effective protection, combined with the applicant’s personal experiences and the broader societal context, was critical in determining the validity of her claim.

Ultimately, the court found the applicant's fear of returning to Tunisia to be well-founded. It noted that despite the existence of laws designed to protect women, these laws were poorly implemented. The applicant’s specific experiences reflected broader systemic issues. Moreover, the court considered the applicant’s situation in light of her status as a divorced woman facing gender-based violence. The COI indicated that women in her position often do not receive adequate state protection and face societal stigma, which substantiated her claim. The court determined that these factors met the criteria for membership in a particular social group under Article 1A(2) of the Geneva Convention and Articles 7 and 8 of Legislative Decree No. 251/2007. Consequently, the court granted her refugee status.

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