The applicant, a national from Egypt, a country designated as safe by Decree-Law No 158 of 23 October 2024, requested asylum in Italy (Pozzallo) and had his application channeled to the accelerated procedure and was issued with a detention order pursuant to Article 6 bis of Legislative Decree No 142/2015 by the Quaestor of the Province of Ragusa.

The court examined whether, and to what extent, Decree-Law No 158 of 23 October 2024 was relevant in the present procedure for validating detention where Egypt has been classified as a safe country. The court noted that the classification done in the Decree Law does not exempt the court from the obligation to verify the compatibility of that designation with EU law in a full and ex nunc examination, which is an obligation stated by the Court of Justice of the EU in the judgment of 4 October 2024 of the Grand Chamber in Case C-406/2022.

The court held that the designation of Egypt as safe country is not compatible with EU law, taking into account the COI relating to Egypt which reveals serious problems related to respect for human rights, namely:

• the right to life (the death penalty is practiced and the number of executions is among the highest),
• freedom of speech and freedom of the press (numerous cases of arbitrary detentions and warrantless arrests by Egyptian police forces, forced disappearances, vague definitions of terrorism-related cases, ill-treatment, enforced disappearances, lack of procedural guarantees and due process, use of criminal laws to repress the activity of social media users perceived as critical of the regime and to criminalise activities characterised as ‘violation of public morals’ and ‘threat to family values’),
• the right to a fair trial (violations against human rights lawyers, rights activists, journalists and opposition politicians, recourse to military courts),
• freedom of religion (investigations, arrests, detentions, prosecutions and, in some cases, convictions for blasphemy),
• regarding women and minors (discrimination, domestic violence, including marital rape, not yet explicitly criminalised in national legislation and clemency in the Criminal Code for so-called ‘honour crimes’)
• LGBTI rights (prosecutions of homosexual behaviour or same-sex unions on charges of “debauchery”, “prostitution” or “violation of family values”, while discrimination is widespread),
• torture or other forms of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (allegations of systematic use of torture and ill-treatment by police, prison guards, law enforcement and military personnel for opponents and critics of the government; lack of investigation and accountability in relation to these abuses),
• in addition, Egypt has not ratified the Optional Protocol to the Convention on Torture and has not ratified Optional Protocol II to the Convention on Civil and Political Rights (the death penalty) and it does not appear to have accepted the procedures for individual complaints provided for in many of the international conventions.

The court also noted that the Fact Sheet from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation listed exceptions for certain categories of persons when noting that Egypt was a safe country. Specifically, for Egypt: political opponents, dissidents, human rights defenders, or those at risk of persecution.

The court noted that these risks of insecurity that affect, in a stable and ordinary manner, entire and indeterminate categories of people lead to the conclusion that Egypt cannot be considered a safe country in the light of EU law and CJEU judgment of 4 October 2024, which require that the country be characterized by a ‘general and constant’ security situation.

In light of the above arguments, the court held that is was necessary to disapply the Decree Law of 23 October 2024 and decided not validate the detention order of the Quaestor of the Province of Ragusa and ordered the immediate release of the applicant.

Registered under C-718/24

The case concerned an application for international protection submitted by a Syrian national and which was rejected by the State Agency for Refugees (SAR). The case reached the cassation appeal level and was re-examined by the SAR, then another appeal was submitted against the second SAR decision. In fact, the applicant is a Syrian national of Arab ethnicity, a Sunni Muslim of religious affiliation, unaccompanied minor, with primary education. His application was rejected on grounds of the concept of safe third country, as the SAR considered that he could safely return to Türkiye where he allegedly previously resided. The applicant contested the residence in Türkiye and stated that his stay, for less than a month could mot be considered for the application of the safe third country concept.

The Administrative Court of Sofia city suspended proceedings and referred questions before the CJEU for interpretation of the recast APD on the concept of safe third country:

1. Is a broad interpretation possible of recital 46 and Article 33(a), (2)(c), read in conjunction with Article 38 of Directive 2013/32/EU, to hold that the rules laid down in those provisions, which allow an application for international protection to be considered inadmissible and which concern the concept of safe third country under Article 38 of Directive 2013/32/EU, are to be applied in proceedings pursuant to Chapter III of that directive, in accordance with the basic principles and guarantees set out in Chapter II of that directive, that is to say, in the examination of the substance of an application for international protection?
2. Is Recital 46 and Article 33(a) and 33 (2) (c), read in conjunction with Article 38 of Directive 2013/32/EU, to be interpreted as meaning that national legislation of the type referred to in Article 75(1) (2) of the Law on Asylum and Refugees (LAR) as well as administrative and case-law according to which an application for international protection which has been examined on its merits may be rejected without being declared manifestly unfounded or inadmissible solely on the ground that it is possible for the applicant to avail himself or herself of the protection of a safe third country, without the provisions of Article 38(a) having been developed and applied in national law are to be followed according to Article 33 (2)(b) of Directive 2013/32/EU and where the administrative authority recognises that there is an armed conflict in the applicant’s country of origin and the conditions laid down in Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive are met?
3. Is Article 38 (2)(a) and (2)(b) of Directive 2013/32, read in the light of recital 46 thereof, to be interpreted as meaning that an administrative authority which examines the substance of an application for international protection may apply the concept of safe third country to a particular country and to a particular applicant only on the basis of information from generally available sources and of a decision adopted by an executive body (Council of Ministers) that a country is a safe third country, without any provision being made in national law?
4. Is Article 38(a) and (2)(a) of Directive 2013/32/EU to be interpreted as meaning that it is necessary for the Member States to lay down, in their national law, criteria on the basis of which it may be assumed that there is a connection between the applicant and the third country concerned on the basis of which it is justified for the applicant to go to that country?
5. Is Article 38 (2)(c) of Directive 2013/32/EU governing the possibility for the applicant to challenge before the courts the existence of a connection between him or her and a third country deemed to be safe, in accordance with point (a), to be interpreted as meaning that, in the absence of a provision of national law providing for judicial review of the lawfulness of the existence of a connection between the applicant and the third country concerned, the court hearing an appeal against an administrative decision refusing to grant international protection to the applicant on the ground that a third country has been deemed to be safe in relation to him or her is necessarily required to declare that it has jurisdiction and to rule on the lawfulness of the connection adopted by the administrative authority?