Between 26 July and 1 October 2015, five Afghan nationals applied for international protection in Norway, claiming to be 15-16 years old. After further assessments, which also included medical age examinations, the immigration authorities considered that they were all older than 18 years. Consequently, their applications were rejected by the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration (UDI) and later confirmed on appeal before the Immigration Appeals Board (UNE). One of the applicants was eventually granted a temporary residence permit, and later a residence permit, due to a risk of persecution linked to his conversion to Christianity. Regarding the other applicants, two of them were deported, while the other two were unaccounted for. The five applicants appealed the IAB's decision before the Supreme Court. The applicants argued that the authorities had incorrectly applied a standard of proof that was not sufficiently strict when determining whether they were minors. Hence, they requested the annulment of all decisions rejecting their asylum claims.

The Supreme Court stated at the outset that the appeal would be dismissed, as there was no basis to apply a different evidentiary threshold. The court held that the standard preponderance of probabilities (meaning a greater than 50% likelihood that a fact is true) must apply when assessing an applicant's age, and that a different evidentiary threshold could not be inferred from the Immigration Act, its preparatory work or the best interests of the child.

First, to determine whether a reduced standard of proof could apply in age assessment procedures, the court analysed the relevant provisions on the Immigration Act. According to the Act, when age cannot be determined with “reasonable certainty”, medical age testing can be carried out with the applicant's consent. However, the court noted that the terms “reasonable certainty” in this context referred only to the threshold for initiating testing and hence did not imply a different standard of proof for determining age. Accordingly, the court held that there was no indication in the Immigration Act that a standard lower than the general preponderance of probabilities should apply in such cases.

Second, the court considered whether a reduced standard of proof could be inferred from the preparatory works of the Immigration Act. According to the court, although the preparatory works acknowledged the uncertainty in age assessments and stressed the need for a broad and cautious evaluation, they did not indicate a lower legal standard. Moreover, subsequent legislative documents and Supreme Court decisions confirmed that the general standard should apply unless both outcomes are equally likely, at which point the benefit of the doubt should apply. Specifically, the court mentioned Prop. 126 L (2016–2017) on amendments to the Immigration Act which held that “any uncertainty in a piece of evidence is part of the assessment of evidence and does not mean that the general standard of proof changes”.

Third, the court assessed whether a non-statutory exemption to the general standard of proof could be inferred based on the principle of the best interests of the child. The court acknowledged that although the best interests of the child must be a fundamental consideration under both the Constitution and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, it did not require a generally reduced standard of proof. Specifically, the court referred to General Comment No. 6 from the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, often cited in support of a lower threshold, which it interpreted as referring primarily to initial arrival procedures and not the substantive assessment of asylum claims.

Finally, regarding the applicant's argument that if their claimed age was not considered credible then they would be branded as liars, the court concluded that being deemed over 18 did not, in this case, imply dishonesty or carry such serious personal consequences as to warrant an exception. Moreover, as to the possible impact of an incorrect age assessment, the court acknowledged that it could impact access to important rights and services reserved for minors. However, it found that this risk was outweighed by strong countervailing concerns, including the potential for abuse of the system and the importance of protecting vulnerable minors from being housed with adults, meaning there was insufficient justification to depart from the general standard of proof.

The court concluded that there was no basis for applying a reduced standard of proof when determining whether an applicant is under or over 18, even from a child-sensitive perspective. It emphasised that age assessment is a well-regulated legal area that is shaped by complex political considerations. However, it argued that the legislator had clearly intended the general standard of proof to apply, due to the high risk of abuse. Nevertheless, the court noted the importance of including safety margins and conducting concrete, nuanced assessments in each case. It also highlighted that applicants should be treated as children until their application is assessed, but that the need for child-sensitive considerations diminishes with age.