K and P, Iraqi nationals, lodged applications for international protection in the Netherlands on 1 February 2022 and 6 July 2023 respectively. The requests were rejected as unfounded by decisions of 15 and 5 July 2024 respectively and it was decided that they would not be granted a residence permit on other grounds. The new policy on credibility assessment, amended on 1 July 2024, and the Work instruction 2024/6, were applied to their cases.
The decisions included a return decision designating Iraq as the country of destination and established four weeks for voluntary departure.
K and P each appealed the decisions before the Court of the Hague seated in Roermond, the referring court. They argued that the manner in which credibility was assessed was not compliant with Article 4(5) of the recast Qualification Directive, as the policy allowed statements not substantiated by documents to also be deemed to be credible. The court stayed the proceedings, as it was uncertain whether Work Instruction 2024/6 was compliant with EU law. In addition, the court noted that the CJEU has not yet expressly stated whether the obligation to find a possible breach of the principle of non-refoulement also applies when reviewing the legality of a decision rejecting an application for international protection as unfounded.
The court referred two questions to the CJEU.
The Government of Netherlands Government submitted that the referring court did not correctly describe the policy and the CJEU recalled that the national court alone has jurisdiction to interpret and apply national law and that in any case the referred question concerns the interpretation of Article 4(5).
To interpret Article 4(5) of the recast QD, the CJEU looked at its wording, the context in which it occurred and the objectives pursued.
The court first noted that the wording of the provision refers to documentary or other evidence, not to authentic and objectively verifiable documents or other objective sources. Rather, unsubstantiated aspects, unsupported by documentary or other evidence, may be taken into account only if the cumulative conditions laid down in Article 4(5)(a) to (e) of the recast QD are met (Fathi, C‑56/17, 4 October 2018). Furthermore, it is for the Member State concerned to cooperate with the applicant so that all the elements capable of substantiating the application for asylum are assembled.
Regarding the context of the provision, the CJEU pointed out that according to Article 4(1), it is the duty of the Member State authorities to assess, in cooperation with the applicant, the relevant elements of the application. In addition, the court noted that the duty to cooperate applies at the first stage of the assessment of an application considering that the first stage consists of establishing the factual circumstances and the second, the legal appraisal of that evidence. The CJEU emphasises that the applicant's statements are merely the starting point of the assessment and the authorities are often better placed to gain access to certain types of documents. Therefore, the court considered that it would be contrary to Article 4 to consider it necessarily for the applicant alone to submit all the substantiating elements. The court also highlighted that Article 4(2) does not restrict the nature of documents an applicant may submit to authentic or objectively verifiable documents.
Furthermore, the CJEU highlighted that according to Recital 10 of the recast Asylum Procedures Directive, Member States should take into account the relevant guidelines drawn up by the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), replaced in 2022 by the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA). The EUAA, in the Judicial Analysis ‘Evidence and credibility assessment in the context of the Common European Asylum System' (17 February 2023) states that evidence may be verbal or documentary, written, graphic, digital, visual materials, physical objects and bodily scarring, as well as audio and visual recordings.
The inability to authenticate a document, or the absence of an objectively verifiable source, cannot in itself justify excluding it from the examination, and the evidence submitted must be assessed in cooperation with the applicant (C‑921/19, 10 June 2021).
The CJEU also emphasised that according to Article 13 of the recast QD, Member States do not have the discretion to refuse refugee status to a person who qualifies (Bundesrepublik Deutschland, C‑753/22, 18 June 2024) and, considering other provisions, they must ensure an individual examination, so rejecting an application because statements are not substantiated by authentic and objectively verifiable documents or objective sources, and not all the conditions of Article 4(5) are met, precludes the required individual examination.
Regarding the objectives of the recast QD, the directive aims to ensure that Member States apply common criteria for the identification of persons genuinely in need of international protection and it is by cooperating with applicants and by including in the assessment of the need for protection all the evidence and elements submitted in support of applications for international protection that Member State authorities are able to identify the persons genuinely in need of international protection.
Therefore, the CJEU ruled that Article 4(5) of the recast QD must be interpreted as meaning that, first, the authority responsible for assessing an application for international protection must cooperate with the applicant and include in the assessment of the need for protection all the evidence and elements submitted in support of the application and, secondly, where the applicant sufficiently substantiates statements with evidence or meets the conditions set out in that provision, that applicant's statements do not require further confirmation and are deemed to be credible.
The second question referred to the CJEU concerned the scope of judicial review and non-refoulement and the CJEU reformulated the question. It understood that the national court wanted to determine whether a national court of first instance hearing an appeal against a decision rejecting an application for international protection must, in its assessment of the legality of such a decision, review, if necessary of its own motion, compliance with the principle of non-refoulement. The CJEU reformulated the question to whether Article 46(3) of the recast APD, read in conjunction with Articles 4, 19(2) and 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted, respectively, as meaning that a national court or tribunal of first instance hearing an appeal against a decision rejecting an application for international protection is required to carry out, if necessary of its own motion, first, a full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of law, including an examination of the international protection needs pursuant to the recast QD, and secondly, a review of any breach of the principle of non-refoulement, on the basis of the material in the file brought to its attention, as supplemented or clarified following adversarial proceedings.
In this regard, the CJEU reminded that Article 19(2) of the EU Charter prohibits removal to a State where there is a serious risk that the person would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. It further referred to Article 46(3) which defines the scope of the right to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal and states that courts must carry out a full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of law necessary in order to make an up-to-date assessment of the case.
The court explained that “ex nunc” means taking into account, where necessary, new evidence that came to light after the decision was adopted, to provide a comprehensive assessment and avoid sending back the case to the determining authority. Furthermore, “full” means that the court must examine both the evidence the determining authority took into account or should have taken into account, and the evidence arising after its decision. Moreover, to ensure the effectiveness of an appeal, judicial review must include, besides the arguments expressly relied on by the applicant, and consider the material in the file and the one brought to the court's attention during the proceedings.
The CJEU further emphasised that once an applicant brings an appeal, that remedy must comply with Article 46(3) of the recast APD, meaning that the court must carry out a full and ex nunc examination regardless of the arguments and grounds expressly put forward, and must not confine itself to them. This includes ruling on the basis of the elements which the determining authority took into account or should have taken into account, the elements which have arisen since the authority adopted its decision, the material in the file which was brought to its attention, and material resulting from adversarial proceedings.
Regarding the review of the non-refoulement principle, the CJEU observed that even when a negative decision on an asylum application includes a return order, they are two separate decisions which are governed by different legal rules. Consequently, rejecting the application does not imply a position on whether the applicant may be removed and thus, the consequences of return are to be taken into account when the return decision is issued against the third-country national. The court noted that the remedy in Article 46(3) of the recast APD relates exclusively to decisions concerning applications for international protection, refusals to reopen an examination, and withdrawals of protection. The provision does not cover decisions imposing an obligation to return.
Regarding return, the CJEU noted that Article 19(2) of the EU Charter, read in conjunction with Article 4, absolutely prohibits removal to a State where there is a serious risk of death penalty, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the conduct of the person concerned, as that prohibition is linked to the values in Article 2 TEU and to human dignity. The court cited Ararat, where it held that a national court must raise of its own motion any infringement of non-refoulement. Effective judicial protection under Article 47 of the EU Charter and Article 13(1) and (2) of the Return Directive would otherwise not be effective nor complete. Lastly, the court highlighted that the obligation to raise of its own motion any infringement of non-refoulement applies irrespective of whether the return decision was adopted during an asylum procedure or in a procedure for a residence permit provided by national law.
Therefore, the CJEU ruled that where a rejection decision is coupled with a return decision, the court or tribunal of first instance hearing an appeal against a decision rejecting an application for international protection must verify of its own motion, on the basis of the material in the file brought to its attention, as supplemented and clarified following adversarial proceedings, that the principle of non-refoulement does not preclude the return of the applicant for international protection.