ŽT, a Senegalese national, arrived in Croatia in late June 2026. Following screening, his application for international protection was processed under the asylum border procedure pursuant to Article 42(1)(j) of the Asylum Procedures Regulation (APR), which makes this procedure mandatory for applicants originating from countries with a recognition rate of 20% or lower. He was accommodated at the Reception Centre for Applicants for International Protection in Dugi Dol. Finding that the applicant had failed to provide convincing evidence that he faced a real risk of persecution or serious harm within the meaning of Articles 20 and 21 of the Law on International and Temporary Protection, on 14 September 2026, the Ministry of the Interior rejected his application as manifestly unfounded and issued a return decision accompanied by a 1-year entry ban.
The applicant challenged the decision before the Administrative Court in Rijeka, arguing that the Ministry had incorrectly characterised his application as being based on economic hardship. He maintained that he had in fact been forced to leave Senegal because he had been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment as a result of working long hours every day, without a day off, while earning insufficient income even to meet his basic daily food requirements, thereby suffering serious harm. He also requested that his appeal be granted suspensive effect.
The Administrative Court rejected the applicant's claims in their entirety, including his request for suspensive effect. It held that the applicant had failed to substantiate the risk of irreparable harm and to demonstrate that suspending the enforcement of the decision would not be contrary to the public interest, as required by Article 42(2) of the Law on Administrative Disputes.
At the outset, the court noted that the application had been processed under the asylum border procedure, which it acknowledged to be more restrictive from the applicant's perspective than the previous framework. It reasoned that the APR introduces circumstances in which the border procedure is mandatory; significantly expands the categories of applicants for international protection subject to that procedure, including through the introduction of a general quantitative criterion based on the recognition rate of applications lodged by nationals of a particular country; shortens the time limit for submitting applications; provides for the exclusion of the right to enter the territory, through the legal fiction that presence at a designated location does not constitute entry into the territory of the Member State concerned; and establishes accommodation at a designated location as the general rule. The court further noted that the courts of the Member States must interpret the new EU legislation in accordance with its meaning and objectives, while ensuring the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms.
The Administrative Court referred to the Ministry of the Interior's assessment of Senegal as a safe country of origin, noting that it had been designated as such by several EU Member States and that, in April 2026, Senegalese nationals had a recognition rate of 7.8%. It noted that international sources continued to document serious shortcomings in the protection of human rights, including cases of violence during protests, difficulties in accessing legal assistance, inadequate detention conditions, restrictions on media freedom and risks faced by particular population groups, especially LGBTIQ+ persons, women and girls, and talibé children. However, it found that none of these circumstances applied to the applicant. It further observed that Senegal was not affected by any international or internal armed conflict, apart from a low-intensity insurgency in the Casamance region, which available sources for 2025-2026 did not characterise as involving widespread indiscriminate violence reaching the threshold of an armed conflict.
As regards the applicant's argument that the particularly harsh working conditions to which he had been subjected amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment and exposed him to serious harm, the court recalled that, although Croatian case law consistently holds that purely economic reasons do not constitute grounds for international protection, certain circumstances may nevertheless be relevant in this context. These include human trafficking, forced labour, confiscation of identity documents and comparable situations, as well as circumstances in which inhuman conditions are causally linked to one of the Convention grounds for asylum (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion). However, noting that workers do not, as such, constitute a particular social group, the court concluded that the applicant's allegations neither established persecution on one of the Convention grounds, nor met the threshold for a finding of a real risk of serious harm.
Lastly, the Administrative Court held that the 1-year entry ban complied with the principle of proportionality under Article 6(2) of the General Administrative Procedure Act. In this regard, it considered that, pursuant to Article 192(6) of the Law on Foreigners, the statutory duration of the measure ranges from 3 months to 5 years and that the ban imposed on the applicant was therefore at the lower end of that range. It further held that the measure was neither disproportionate, unreasonable nor arbitrary, was not based on an incorrect or incomplete assessment of the facts, and did not place the applicant in a less favourable position than other third-country nationals in comparable circumstances.
Accordingly, the court concluded that the application had been correctly processed under the border procedure and that the applicant had rightfully been refused both refugee status and subsidiary protection.