A national of Côte d'Ivoire requested international protection on 26 March 2026. She claimed to fear reprisals from persons associated with the ruling party in Côte d'Ivoire, the Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace (RHDP), on account of her alleged support for the Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI). Specifically, she alleged that she had been dismissed from her employment because of her political views, harassed by colleagues for her opposition to the ruling party, and abducted by armed men allegedly affiliated with the authorities. On 19 June 2026, the Minister of Home Affairs examined the merits of the applicant's application for international protection under an accelerated procedure, pursuant to Article 27(1)(a) and (h) of the Law of 18 December 2015 on international protection and temporary protection. It found that the applicant had raised only issues irrelevant to the assessment of whether she qualified for international protection (point (a)), and that she had entered or remained unlawfully in the territory and, without valid reason, had failed to present herself to the authorities or lodge an application for international protection as soon as possible, taking into account the circumstances of her entry (point (h)). The minister rejected the application, considering the applicant's account of political persecution insufficiently substantiated, given her limited and informal political involvement, the general and speculative nature of her alleged fears, and the absence of sufficient evidence linking her political opinions to her dismissal and alleged abduction. On 7 July 2026, the applicant lodged an appeal before the Administrative Tribunal seeking the annulment of the decision to examine her application for international protection under an accelerated procedure, the decision refusing to grant international protection, and the order to leave the territory contained in the same instrument.

The tribunal first clarified the legal framework applicable to each aspect of the contested decision. As regards, first, the decision to examine the application under an accelerated procedure pursuant to Article 27(1) of the Law of 18 December 2015, the tribunal affirmed that Article 44 of the Law of 11 June 2026 implementing the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum provides for the continued application of certain provisions of the Law of 18 December 2015, including Article 27(1), to applications lodged before 12 June 2026 and pending examination on that date, as was the case here. It further clarified that, pursuant to Article 79(3), the Asylum Procedure Regulation (APR) applies only to applications lodged as from 12 June 2026 and was therefore inapplicable in the present case. As regards the refusal of international protection, the tribunal held that the assessment of the merits of the Minister's decision had to be carried out in accordance with the Qualification Regulation (QR). It noted that Article 42 expressly provides for the QR's application from 12 June 2026, irrespective of whether the application for international protection was lodged before or after that date. Accordingly, the tribunal ruled that the QR applied to the present case, notwithstanding that the application had been lodged before 12 June 2026. In this regard, the tribunal also noted that the provisions governing the conditions for granting international protection had not essentially changed between the Law of 18 December 2015 and the QR. As regards the legislation applicable to the order to leave the territory, the tribunal clarified that, pursuant to Article 44 of the Law of 11 June 2026, Articles 34(2) and 2(q) of the Law of 18 December 2015 governing return decisions remain applicable to applications lodged before 12 June 2026 and pending on that date. It also noted that Article 37 of the APR, governing return decisions following the rejection or withdrawal of an application for international protection, was not applicable in the present case. Accordingly, the order to leave the territory had to be assessed under the provisions of the Law of 18 December 2015 applicable at the time of its adoption.

As regards the appeal against the decision to examine the application under an accelerated procedure, the tribunal clarified that, pursuant to Article 27(1) of the Law of 18 December 2015, the minister may examine the merits of an application under an accelerated procedure where either of the conditions set out therein is met. Under point (a), this is the case when the facts raised by the applicant are irrelevant to the assessment of whether they qualify for international protection. Under point (h), it applies where the applicant has entered or unlawfully prolonged their stay in the territory and, without valid reason, has failed to report to the authorities or lodge an application as soon as possible, taking into account the circumstances of their entry. The tribunal clarified that these grounds are alternative rather than cumulative, meaning that the fulfillment of either condition alone is sufficient to justify the minister's decision. With regard more specifically to point (a) of Article 27(1) of the Law of 18 December 2015, the tribunal referred to the definitions and eligibility criteria for refugee status and subsidiary protection set out in Article 3(5) and (6) of the QR. It further outlined the relevant requirements concerning acts of persecution, serious harm and the actors responsible for such acts, as provided for in Articles 6, 7, 9 and 15 of the QR. The tribunal noted that the definition of subsidiary protection encompasses persons at risk of future serious harm, without requiring that the applicant has suffered serious harm before leaving her country of origin. However, when past persecution or serious harm has occurred, Article 4(4)³ of the QR establishes a rebuttable presumption that the persecution or serious harm already suffered will recur upon return to the country of origin. The tribunal further noted that the minister may rebut the presumption of recurrence of past persecution or serious harm by demonstrating that there are good reasons to believe that such persecution or serious harm will not recur.

Regarding the applicant's political claims, the tribunal found that the fears invoked remained general, hypothetical and insufficiently individualised. First, the applicant had failed to demonstrate that she was actually perceived as a political opponent by the Ivorian authorities. Indeed, according to her own statements, she was not a member of the PDCI and had not publicly expressed her political opinions, but had shared them only with her work colleagues and in the context of her draughts games. Moreover, she had never been subjected to threats or malicious acts established to be directly linked to her political opinions. Furthermore, in the absence of concrete evidence explaining why her dismissal and her alleged abduction would have been motivated by her political opinions, and given that she herself had stated that these two events were unrelated, the tribunal considered that the connection between these events and the political opinions she claimed to have expressed in a strictly private context had not been sufficiently established. The tribunal further observed that the applicant failed to provide concrete evidence that the alleged risk remained current more than 14 years later. In particular, she had established neither that she was currently identified, sought or specifically targeted by the State, nor that she would consequently face a risk of persecution or inhuman or degrading treatment at the hands of the Ivorian authorities.

On this basis, the tribunal concluded that the applicant had raised only issues irrelevant to the assessment of whether she fulfilled the conditions for qualifying for international protection, and that the conditions for applying Article 27(1)(a) of the Law of 18 December 2015 were therefore satisfied in the present case. Hence, the tribunal dismissed as manifestly unfounded the appeal insofar as it sought the reformation of the Minister's decision to examine the application under an accelerated procedure. It held that there was no need to examine the arguments based on Article 27(1)(h) of the Law of 18 December 2015, as such examination had become superfluous.

For the same reasons, the tribunal considered that, in light of the facts and arguments relied upon by the applicant in support of her application, both during her interview and throughout the judicial proceedings, she did not fulfill the conditions for qualifying for international protection. Accordingly, the appeal against the Ministerial decision refusing international protection was dismissed as manifestly unfounded.

Regarding the Minister's decision ordering the applicant to leave the territory, the tribunal clarified that, pursuant to Article 34(2) of the Law of 18 December 2015, a Ministerial decision constitutes a return decision, and that the order to leave the territory is the automatic consequence of the refusal of international protection. Since the tribunal concluded that the Minister had been justified in rejecting the applicant's application, implying that her return to her country of origin would expose her neither to acts of persecution nor to serious harm, it held that the Minister was also entitled to accompany the refusal decision with an order to leave the territory, without violating the principle of non-refoulement invoked by the applicant.