A Ukrainian national submitted an application for international protection on 14 November 2023. By decision of 7 May 2024, the Head of the Office for Foreigners refused to grant him refugee status and subsidiary protection. The authority found that the applicant had not established a well-founded fear of persecution in Ukraine. It nevertheless considered that, if returned, he would face a serious and individual threat to his life or health arising from widespread violence against the civilian population in the context of the international armed conflict in Ukraine, and that he could not relocate to another part of the country. However, the authority considered that the applicant was excluded from subsidiary protection because he could constitute a threat to state security or society under Article 20(1)(2)(c) of the Protection Act (which transposes Article 17(1)(d) of the recast QD). It relied on his final conviction by a Polish district court under Article 178a (1) of the Criminal Code for driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated. The criminal court had imposed a fine and a three-year prohibition on driving motor vehicles.

The Refugee Council upheld the decision on appeal. It agreed that the situation in Ukraine otherwise justified subsidiary protection, but considered that the applicant had seriously disregarded the legal order in Poland. It considered the offence to be serious and, by reference to its social harmfulness, compatible with the exclusion grounds.

The applicant challenged the decision before the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw, arguing, inter alia, that driving under the influence of alcohol could not in itself constitute a threat to state security or society without consideration of the individual circumstances. The court dismissed the complaint on 27 March 2025. It considered that driving while intoxicated endangered other persons and constituted a breach of the legal order. It further considered that the applicant's conduct demonstrated a serious disregard for the legal order and gave rise to a justified doubt as to his future compliance with the law.

The applicant brought a cassation appeal. The Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) found the appeal justified with regard to the interpretation of Article 20(1)(2)(c) of the Protection Act, although it found no violation of the procedural provision concerning adjudication on the basis of the case file.

The SAC referred to the CJEU case law according to which exclusion provisions constitute exceptions to the general rule of granting international protection and must therefore be interpreted strictly. It referred to  K. L. v Migration Department at the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Lithuania [Galte] (C-63/24, 30 April 2025, para 41), Shajin Ahmed v Immigration and Asylum Office (HU, Bevándorlási És Állampolgársági Hivatal) (C-369/17, 13 September 2018, paras. 49–50) and Germany v B and D (C-57/09 and C-101/09, 9 November 2010 , para 87). The court stated that the assessment of an exclusion ground cannot be automatic and requires an individual assessment of each case.

With regard to the concept of a “danger to the community” under Article 17(1)(d), the SAC referred to the standard developed by the CJEU concerning Article 14(4)(b) of the recast QD. It referred to the CJEU judgement XXX v Commissaire général aux réfugiés et aux apatrides (CGRS) (C-8/22, 6 July 2023, paras. 56 and 60) and Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid v M.A. (C-402/22, 6 July 2023, para 54). According to the CJEU, a person can be regarded as constituting a danger to the community only where the person's individual conduct represents a real, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of the society of the host Member State.

The SAC stated that a similar requirement applies to the ground concerning a threat to state security. It distinguished this ground from danger to the community and associated it with the concept of national security under Article 24(1) of the recast QD. It also referred to CJEU case law concerning public security, encompassing internal and external security and including threats to the functioning of fundamental state institutions and public services, the life of the population, foreign relations, peaceful coexistence between nations and military interests.

The court further referred to  Κ.Α.Μ. v Republic of Cyprus, (C-454/23, 27 February 2025, paras 43-49) concerning previous acts or conduct. According to SAC, such conduct may be relevant to assessing whether a person has a tendency to maintain such conduct or repeat such acts in the future, taking account in particular of the seriousness of the conduct and subsequent circumstances.

Applying these principles, the SAC held that the commission by a person with no previous criminal record of the offence of driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated did not constitute a threat affecting the fundamental interests of society or state security. The court noted that the authorities had essentially relied on the applicant's serious disregard for the legal order and the social harmfulness of the offence, without carrying out the required assessment of the nature of the threat.

The court distinguished the general social harmfulness of an offence from the significance of criminal conduct for the purposes of the exclusion provisions. It held that the offence under Article 178a(1) of the Criminal Code did not satisfy the threshold of a “serious crime” under Article 17(1)(b) of the recast QD. The exclusion grounds based on danger to society or state security nevertheless concern conduct displaying a significant degree of seriousness. Hereto, the court made reference to the EUAA Judicial Analysis on Exclusion: Articles 12 and 17 Qualification Directive.

The court stated that as a rule, this ground should apply to applicants who are highly socially maladjusted, radicalised, or systematically engaged in activities whose nature disrupts the proper functioning of the state and undermines the fundamental social order. It elaborated that this includes for example, objectively and reliably established involvement in serious criminal activity, repeated offending, or socially disruptive conduct demonstrating an intentional disregard for the legal order. It also stated that an accumulation of acts which individually do not reach the threshold of a serious offence may be relevant where the number and nature of violations affect the assessment of the person's future conduct.

The SAC held that a single offence committed by a person with no previous criminal record did not constitute criminal activity of this nature. Consequently, from the preventive perspective of Article 17(1)(d) of the recast QD, the conviction could not constitute grounds for refusing the applicant international protection.

The SAC also held that, when assessing whether conduct gives rise to the relevant threat, the authorities should consider not only the type of offence, its protected legal interest and the statutory penalty, but also the penalty actually imposed. In this respect, it referred to the CJEU ruling Shajin Ahmed v Immigration and Asylum Office (HU, Bevándorlási És Állampolgársági Hivatal) (C-369/17, 13 September 2018, para 58) concerning the assessment of a “serious crime” under Article 17(1)(b), and Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid v M.A. (C-402/22, 6 July 2023, para 41) concerning the relevance of the actual sentence imposed when assessing the seriousness of an offence under Article 14(4)(b).

In the present case, the criminal court had imposed only a fine of 70 daily rates of PLN 30 each. The SAC noted that this was a financial, non-custodial sanction and that the criminal court had considered it adequate having regard to the applicant's degree of guilt and the social harmfulness of the offence. The criminal court had also imposed a three-year prohibition on driving, which was the minimum statutory period. The SAC noted that this measure was intended to separate the applicant from road traffic and to address the risk associated with his conduct.

The SAC further held that the exclusion ground requires the danger to be “present”. Referring to the CJEU judgment XXX v Commissaire général aux réfugiés et aux apatrides (CGRS) (C-8/22, 6 July 2023, para 64), it stated that this involved establishing a risk of future non-compliance with the legal order. Since the applicant had no previous criminal record, the exclusion decision could not be based on an assumption that he would breach the driving prohibition in the future. The SAC considered that the first-instance court's finding of a justified doubt concerning his future compliance with the law was insufficiently supported by the evidence.

The SAC concluded that the applicant's conviction and fine for driving while intoxicated did not reach the threshold of a serious crime and that relying on the “danger to society” ground as an alternative basis for exclusion in respect of a person with no previous criminal record who had committed an ordinary offence was not consistent with the exclusion provisions. It noted that this conclusion was not altered by the possibility that the circumstances in which the applicant, who had been residing in Poland on a work visa, applied for international protection might indicate that the procedure was being treated instrumentally.

The Supreme Administrative Court therefore upheld the cassation appeal, set aside the judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court of Warsaw and annulled both the decision of the Refugee Council and the preceding decision of the Head of the Office for Foreigners.