The applicant, an Iranian national, requested international protection together with her husband on 7 June 2024, claiming that she converted to Christianity, which is punishable by death in Iran. By decisions dated 13 and 14 January 2025, The Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum (BFA) rejected the applications and issued return decisions to Iran.
The applicants appealed against the decision before the Federal Administrative Court (BVwG), which rejected the appeals. The BVwG found that, although the applicant was baptised on 20 April 2025 following approximately one year of baptismal preparation, she did not convert to Christianity out of inner conviction, but only for the sake of appearance. The Christian faith did not become part of her identity.
The applicants appealed the decision initially before the Constitutional Court, which referred the matter to the Supreme Administrative Court (VwGH). The applicants argued that the BVwG deviated from the VwGH's established case law on the obligation to provide adequate reasons and had assessed the evidence concerning the applicant's conversion in an untenable and one-sided manner. They argued that her father's recovery motivated her conversion and that she seriously practices the religion.
The VwGH annulled the decision of the BVwG and referred to its established case law, according to which a well-founded fear of asylum relevant persecution on account of conversion may arise where it can be assumed that the converted applicant would, upon return to his country of origin, engage in religious activities that would expose him to an actual risk of persecution. In determining whether a person has genuinely converted to another religion and whether this conversion may expose them to persecution, the decisive factor is whether the new faith has become a genuine part of the person's current convictions. This requires an assessment of the person's overall circumstances, including their statements, testimony, and answers concerning their religious life. Factors indicating a sincere conversion may include the person's understanding of the new faith, the extent to which they actively practise it, changes in their behaviour, and whether they can credibly explain why and how the conversion took place.
The court further held that asylum authorities and the BVwG must neither question the content of a person's religious beliefs nor replace the understanding of the beliefs of the individual, church or religious community with their own interpretation. Their assessment must instead remain focused on the asylum-related question of whether the applicant's religious beliefs and activities could give rise to a risk of persecution upon return to their country of origin.
The VwGH reiterated that, where external circumstances do not make a conversion out of inner conviction appear unlikely, the courts are required to examine the applicant's personality, credibility and the circumstances of the conversion in detail. The evidence must be carefully assessed and, where necessary, persons who can provide information about the conversion and the beliefs underlying it must be heard, even where the applicant initially made false statements concerning the reasons for fleeing their country of origin. In assessing the evidence, courts must also consider that individuals may have different and highly personal ways of relating to their religious faith. Thus, applicants cannot be subjected to excessive expectations regarding their knowledge of the Bible or theology.
The VwGH held that the BVwG assessed the evidence in an unjustified and illogical manner. The circumstances indicating a serious conversion included the applicant's baptism following approximately one year of baptismal preparation, her regular attendance at church services, her assistance with church duties on Sundays, her participation in online courses on the Christian faith, and her explanations concerning her reasons for converting and her knowledge of Christianity.
The VwGH also found the BVwG's assessment concerning the significance of baptism for the applicant's religious life to be unconvincing. In particular, the BVwG had concluded that the applicant's answer concerning the significance of baptism did not establish that baptism had become a defining element of her identity. According to the VwGH, however, this assessment failed to consider the applicant's personal approach to and understanding of her baptism, which she had described in detail. The court therefore considered this aspect of the BVwG's reasoning to be insufficient.
The VwGH further found the BVwG's reasoning concerning the applicant's motivation for turning to Christianity to be incomprehensible. This concerned, in particular, her account of the “miraculous” healing of a girl through prayers in church and the subsequent recovery of her father. The VwGH also considered it not readily comprehensible that the BVwG concluded that the applicant's efforts to inform herself about Christianity via the internet did not demonstrate a deeper engagement with the faith, as the BVwG failed to explain what form of engagement would have been required for it to qualify as “deeper”.
Persuant to Section 34(4) of the Asylum Act, this also affected the other applicant as a family member. Thus, the decision concerning the second applicant was also set aside.