The State Agency for Refugees under the Council of Ministers lodged a cassation appeal against the ruling of 19 February 2026 in which the Supreme Administrative Court (Applicants v State Agency for Refugees, No. 11199/2025) annulled certain provisions of the Council of Ministers' Decision 278/02.05.2025 on a Program for Humanitarian Support and Integration of Displaced Persons from Ukraine with Temporary Protection. In essence, the Supreme Administrative Court, sitting in a three-member panel, determined that Section V of the above decision concerning risk groups unjustifiably restricted access to accommodation for minors aged 0-12 who are accompanied by only one parent or adult caring for them, contrary to the asylum law provisions. It also found that the restriction on accommodation by accepting a child only with one parent violated the right for family life as enshrined in Article 8 of the ECHR and Article 3 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UN CRC).

In the cassation appeal, the Council of Ministers sought annulment of the contested judgment on grounds related to alleged violations of the substantive law, claiming a lack of legal interest from the applicants to challenge the program.

First, the Supreme Administrative Court, sitting in a five-member panel of the first chamber, ruled that the cassation appeal is unfounded on the merits and upheld the contested judgment. It agreed with the findings in the contested judgment that item 5.1. letter a) of Section V ‘Risks group' of the program, which specifies the category of persons under a group risk and provides that a child from 0 to the age of 12, accompanied by one parent or another adult caring for the child by proxy, are contrary to the definition of applicants with special needs pursuant to §1, item 17 of the Additional Provisions of the Law on Asylum and Refugees (LAR). The latter provides a legal definition of persons belonging to a vulnerable group and includes that these are ‘minors, unaccompanied minors, people with disabilities, the elderly, pregnant women, single parents with minor children, victims of trafficking in human beings, persons with serious health problems, persons with mental disorders, persons with disabilities and victims of torture, rape or other serious forms of mental, physical or sexual violence.' In addition, the court referred to Article 3(1) of the Persons and Family Act (LPA) which defines minors as persons who have not reached the age of 14. Against this background, the court affirmed that the condition introduced for a child from 0 to the age of 12 is restrictive because it contradicts §1, item 17 of the Additional Provisions of the LAR in which minors are explicitly included without age limitation. To reach this conclusion, the court also reiterated that the Council of Ministers was bound by national and EU law on temporary protection.

The court further noted that the three-member panel correctly reasoned that item 5.1, letter "a" of Section "V. Risk Groups" of the Program, defining a category of persons in a risk group, is contrary to Article 27(3) of the UN CRC Convention because it entails a restriction for children, based on age, to exercise their basic right to housing and accommodation. According to Article 27(3) of the UN CRC, States Parties must take the adequate measures to assist parents in fulfilling a child's right to an adequate standard of living, including through programs for material assistance, food, clothing and housing, in line with their national programs. This obligation applies to all children irrespective of their nationality, origin or legal status. Consequently, the court found that the contested requirement introduced an inadmissible discrimination because of an unjustified distinction between children based on their age when it comes to their access to the fundamental right to shelter, accommodation and housing.

Second, the court further agreed that the requirement introduced in item 5.1, letter "a" and item 5.2, letter "a" of Section V "Risk Groups" of the Program for the child to be accompanied by only one parent or by another adult constitutes a direct violation of the fundamental principle of preserving family unity. It emphasised that the family constitutes the natural environment for the development and well-being of children and that the Preamble of the UN CRC, as an instrument directly applicable pursuant to Article 5(4) of the Constitution, provides that a child must grow in a family environment for a full and harmonious development. Moreover, the court referred to the Member States' positive obligation under Article 8 of the European Convention in Human Rights (ECHR) to ensure protection of family life which is a fundamental human right. It acknowledged that any unjustified restriction to the legally recognised relationship between a parent and his/her children can result in irreversible negative consequences for the mental health and development of both the child and his parents. The court emphasised that this is even more critical in this particular case, since these are children located outside their country of origin, thus maintaining the relationship and cohabitation with both parents is of paramount importance, otherwise it could lead to serious damage to the best interests of the child.

Consequently, by limiting the provision of housing of a child with only one parent, the provisions of item 5.1, letter "a" and item 5.2, letter "a" of the Program are in practice forcibly separating the family, thus the child is deprived of the right to live together with both parents. This situation was found in direct contradiction to the guaranteed right to respect for family life as enshrined under Article 8 of the ECHR. Therefore, the five-member panel agreed with the three-member panel of the Supreme Administrative Court that the contested provisions were unlawful.

The judgment of the five-member panel is final and cannot be further contested.