A Libyan national applied for asylum on 12 March 2019, citing a fear of persecution by militias because of his former position as a soldier in the Libyan army from 1997-2011, during which he worked for the Internal Security Organisation within the Abu Salim and Ain Zara prisons. The Minister for Migration and Asylum considered that the applicant was personally responsible for detention, torture and serious ill-treatment of people amounting to war crimes, crimes against humanity and serious non-political crimes. On 30 September 2020, it rejected the application as manifestly unfounded, invoking Article 1F(a) and (b) of the Refugee Convention, and imposed an entry ban.
The applicant appealed before the District Court of the Hague, seated in Arnhem. The court found that the minister correctly applied the exclusion grounds, however, the latter did not assess sufficiently whether the applicant would run a real risk of serious harm if returned to Libya.
The applicant first argued that the minister, after requesting medical advice on whether the applicant could be heard, it acted negligently by relying on the Forensic Medical Society Utrecht (FMMU)'s medical advice without questioning its consistency. The court reiterated that the minister may generally rely on FMMU advice prepared in accordance with the Medical Advice Protocol, provided that the advice is professionally prepared, transparent, and conclusive. In this case, the FMMU issued three opinions within a two-month period. The first two concluded that the applicant could not be interviewed due to psychological concerns and recommended further assessment and treatment. The third opinion, issued seven weeks later by the same FMMU doctor, found that although a medical complaint existed, it did not prevent the applicant from being interviewed. The court found no evidence that the FMMU had failed to follow the protocol and therefore presumed that the advice had been prepared with due care. It also considered the third opinion to be sufficiently clear, transparent, and reasoned. The fact that the applicant's representative subsequently raised concerns about the applicant's mental state did not oblige the minister to seek further clarification from the FMMU. The interview records and subsequent corrections did not indicate that the applicant was unable to explain his case. Apart from the applicant's complaint regarding the conduct of one interviewer, the court found no indication that the interviews were conducted improperly or that he lacked the capacity to participate. Moreover, it noted that the minister ultimately accepted the credibility of the applicant's statements. Therefore, the court found that this complaint did not succeed.
The applicant argued that the minister acted negligently by not having the additional interview conducted by a specialised officer from the IND's 1F unit, which deals with cases involving possible exclusion under Article 1F of the Refugee Convention. The court dismissed this argument. It found that neither legislation, policy, nor case law requires interviews in 1F cases to be conducted by specialised 1F officers. The documents relied upon by the applicant merely showed that the 1F unit is responsible for investigating cases where there are indications of conduct falling within Article 1F and that it provides support to interview and decision-making officers. The relevant work instruction indicated that cases are generally referred to the 1F unit only after completion of an interview focusing on potential 1F issues, and that a further interview by specialised 1F officers takes place only when necessary.
Following this, the court assessed whether the exclusion grounds were correctly invoked. It noted that it emerges from COI that the Internal Security Organisation of Libya had frequently been guilty of unlawful detention, torture and ill-treatment which violated human rights in Abu Salim prison in Tripoli. The applicant did not dispute this, nor was it disputed that these crimes fall under the ambit of Article 1F(a) and (b) of the Refugee Convention. Rather, the principal question was whether the applicant personally and knowingly participated in such crimes.
The court first found that the requirement of knowing participation was satisfied. Based on country information cited by the authorities, including reports from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the United States Department of State, it was widely known that Abu Salim prison was associated with severe abuses under the regime of Muammar Gaddafi. The prison's reputation was so notorious that a proverb circulated in Libya stating that anyone entering Abu Salim was considered dead. Given this widely known reputation, together with the applicant's own statements that the prison mainly held political and religious opponents of the regime and that he had direct contact with detainees, the court considered it implausible that he was unaware of the abuses occurring there.
The court also concluded that the applicant had personal participation in the crimes. The applicant admitted that he transported prisoners to and from interrogations and sometimes sat among them to collect information. According to the court, this role made him an indispensable link in the system that exposed prisoners to a significant risk of torture and ill-treatment. His actions therefore constituted a contribution which had an effect on the commission of these crimes, and the court considered that the crimes would likely not have taken place in the same way without individuals performing the applicant's role, or if the applicant had made use of opportunities to prevent those crimes.
Finally, the court rejected several of the applicant's defences. His low rank, the dictatorial context, and the risk of punishment for disobeying orders did not negate his personal contribution, particularly since he continued working in the role and his statements did not indicate moral objection to the abuses. The court also confirmed that a criminal investigation or conviction is not required in order to establish participation for the purposes of Article 1F. On this basis, the court concluded that the authorities had sufficiently demonstrated both knowing and personal participation, and therefore justified the application of the exclusion clause.
The court then turned to an assessment of whether the applicant ran a real risk of a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR and Article 3 of the UN Convention Against Torture if he returns to Libya. The applicant argued that he would face a real risk of imprisonment and torture if returned to Libya, relying on past experiences of detention and torture in 2014 and country information showing that former Gaddafi loyalists are still targeted by militias. The minister accepted parts of the applicant's account but concluded that he did not belong to a vulnerable risk group and that there was no real risk upon return, pointing to his residence in Tunisia, the time elapsed since past harm, his ability to obtain a passport, and the fact that his family remains in Libya without problems. The court held that the minister had not properly justified these conclusions. In particular, it was insufficiently explained why the applicant was excluded from the relevant risk group, how the country information was assessed, and why past torture and ongoing risks from militias did not still indicate danger. The reliance on the passport issue, passage of time, and family situation was also found inadequate. It therefore concluded that the minister failed to sufficiently reason that there was no real and foreseeable risk of a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR, so the return decision and entry ban were not upheld.
The appeal was declared unfounded and the court annulled the decision of the minister in so far as it related to the assessment against Article 3 of the ECHR. The minister was ordered to take a new decision in accordance with this judgment.