A Syrian national requested international protection on 29 August 2022. The Deputy Commissioner for Refugees and Stateless Persons (CGRS) issued a decision on 23 October 2024, excluding the applicant from refugee status and subsidiary protection for having committed a serious non-political crime, including forced child marriage and rape, as he married his wife ‘K.' when she was 12 years old. The applicant appealed this decision before the Council for Alien Law Litigation.
The council, with reference to the CJEU ruling of Shajin Ahmed (Afghanistan) v Immigration and Asylum Office (HU, Bevándorlási És Állampolgársági Hivatal) (C-369/17, 13 September 2018), recalled the purposes of the exclusion grounds; to exclude persons deemed unworthy of international protection and to maintain the credibility of the Common European Asylum System. It highlighted that exclusion grounds must be applied restrictively, and that the standard of proof falls below that of criminal law, requiring only ‘serious grounds to believe' which must be based on clear, reliable and credible evidence. It also recalled the variations of the conceptualisation of crime under different jurisdictions, noting that while national criminal law should be taken into account, the scope of this ground must be determined on the basis of international norms. In the present case, it noted that the crimes include forced marriage and rape which are prohibited under the Belgian Penal Code. It noted that the fact that these crimes may not be punishable in Syria, does not preclude the application of the exclusion grounds, in accordance the EUAA Practical Guide on Exclusion for Serious (Non-Political) Crimes. The council held that the concept of a ‘serious (non-political) crime' is an autonomous and sui generis one, which requires a uniform and directive compliant interpretation, as ruled by the CJEU in Ahmed. The council also set out the criteria for assessing the seriousness of a crime as established in the Ahmed judgment, and the EASO Judicial Analysis Exclusion: Articles 12 and 17 Qualification Directive. Second edition. With reference to national law, as well as various European and international instruments, the council found international consensus that forced marriage, forced child marriage and rape constitute serious crimes.
The council assessed the nature of the applicant's crimes and the harm caused. It set out the legal framework of forced child marriages, noting that Article 146ter of the Belgian Civil Code defines a forced marriage as one entered into without the free consent of both spouses, or where the consent of at least one was given under coercion or threat. It noted that the absence of free will can stem from physical, psychological, sexual, financial or emotional pressure, and affirmed that these conditions do not need to be cumulative. It distinguished forced marriage from an arranged marriage, which it considered in principle valid, though acknowledging that the two can come close where ‘arranging' involves intended or unintended pressure such as social, familial, economic or strategic motives.
Drawing on country-of-origin information, the Istanbul Convention and the CJEU case law, the council detailed the harmful direct and long-term consequences of forced child marriage including physical and psychological suffering, heightened risk of domestic violence, restricted access to schooling, early pregnancy with attendant health complications, social isolation, and vulnerability to exploitation and abuse.
Turning to the facts of the case, the court found that the applicant entered into a religious marriage with K. on 12 February 2019, when he was 25 and K. had just turned twelve, and he admitted knowing her age. The council rejected his claim that K. was actually born in 2004 rather than 2007, finding it unsubstantiated and inconsistent in light of his earlier statements. It found K. was unprepared for married life, citing the applicant's own statements that he wanted a wife to cook and keep house, that the first year was difficult because she was not yet mature, and that he could have waited until she reached majority but chose not to because he wanted a stable life.
The council found no indication of any coercion exerted on the applicant, noting that the marriage was his own choice and initiative, his family applied no pressure, and his sisters (then 20 and 22) remained unmarried, so forced child marriage cannot be regarded as customary in his family or region. With reference to EASO COI Report: Syria - Situation of women (February 2020), it rejected his argument that child marriage is ordinary in Syria, noting that Syrian law set the marriage age at eighteen (or fifteen with guardian and court consent) by 2019, that UNICEF 2006 data showed 13% of Syrian girls married before eighteen and 3% before fifteen, that such marriages were most prevalent in Dara'a, Rif Dimashq and Quneitra rather than his home province of Aleppo, and that he was already nearly eighteen when the conflict began, so he was largely formed before the conflict aggravated child marriage. The council also dismissed his reliance on the later official confirmation of the marriage purportedly at K.'s request, finding it occurred on his own initiative for family-reunification purposes when K. was still only fifteen and in a precarious situation since she was married religiously at twelve in Türkiye where this was legally impossible, with two young children, left behind when he departed Türkiye in August 2022.
The council concluded that the applicant failed to make it concretely plausible that the marriage was the free choice of both parties or arose from mutual interest on equal footing, given that the initiative was entirely his, that he barely knew the eleven-year-old K. when he announced his intention to marry her, and that nothing in his statements shows K. freely and informedly consented. The council considered that the fact that K. was supposedly given room to refuse did not amount to a process of mutual, informed consent and free choice, given she was barely eleven and he was twenty-four. The argument that his acts were not criminal in Syria was rejected as the council held that for assessing exclusion for a serious (non-political) crime, what matters is the criminal law of the country of asylum, interpreted within the scope set by international norms. Accordingly, the council ruled that applicant should have been aware of the harmful consequences of such a marriage, even any consent K. may have given could not be regarded as full and informed, and it cannot be concluded that her consent was free of physical, psychological, sexual, financial or emotional pressure.
Move over, the council found that by having sexual relations with his wife from the first night of the marriage, he committed rape, as his wife could not consent based on her age and their age difference. It also noted that the bodily injury inflicted is inherent in the nature of the act.
The council therefore found that based on the nature of the offences and the aggravating circumstances and damage caused, the applicant had committed serious crimes which were condemned at European and international level.
Following this, the court assessed the individual responsibility of the applicant, which it held must be established in accordance with the EUAA judicial analysis and CJEU ruling of Germany v B and D (C-57/09 and C-101/09, 9 November 2010). It found his individual responsibility to be established, noting that he was an adult at the time of the marriage, and that the marriage took place based on his own initiative and free and conscious choice, without regard to K's free will. It also referred to the lack of pressure or coercion exerted on the applicant and his awareness (or should have been aware) of the harmful consequence on the child.
It furthermore noted that the fact that the legality of the marriage is not questioned by the Syrian authorities, and that the applicant is not criminally liable in Syria as a result of the marriage or for the rape since Syrian criminal law does not criminalise marital rape, does not undermine the classification of the offence or detract from his individual responsibility.
The council thus found that there were serious reasons to believe that the applicant committed a serious non-political crime, warranting his exclusion from refugee and subsidiary protection status.
The appeal was declared unfounded.