The German Federal Social Court referred questions to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling on whether national provisions reducing material reception conditions are compatible with the recast Reception Conditions Directive (RCD), specifically in the context of reception of an asylum applicant pending enforcement of a decision on a Dublin transfer.

By decision of 25 October 2021, F.B., an Afghan national, had his international protection application rejected as inadmissible by the Federal Office for Migration and Asylum (BAMF), on grounds that Romania was responsible for examining it under the Dublin III Regulation. The applicant's transfer was suspended in particular because the Romanian authorities decided to no longer accept such transfers as of 1st March 2022 due to the war in Ukraine. Between September – December 2021, FB was housed in a reception facility where, pursuant to Articles 3 and 3a of the Asylum Seekers Benefits Act, he received benefits covering his basic needs (food, accommodation, heating, clothes) and a financial allowance paid by that district to cover his essential personal needs.  Between 1st January 2022 – 23 February 2022, the district authority decided to reduce the benefits which covered his basic needs and the financial allowance. Hence, he was granted only certain benefits in kind, namely food, accommodation and heating, personal and health care, and medical assistance in case of illness. FB appealed against the reduction of his material reception conditions and successfully claimed higher benefits before the Bavarian State Social Court.

In an onward appeal lodged by the district authority, the Federal Social Court questioned before the CJEU the compatibility with EU law of national provisions of the law relating to benefits for asylum applicants, in particular Article 1a(7), read in conjunction with Article 1a(1) of the Asylum Seekers Benefits Act, under which asylum applicants subject to an enforceable obligation to leave the territory can only claim, during the period at issue in the main proceedings, material reception conditions limited to the needs for food and accommodation, including heating, as well as personal and health care.

From the outset, the CJEU clarified under admissibility that the referring court correctly found that the recast RCD was applicable to the FB's circumstances, namely that the reception directive equally governs the reception conditions of applicants for international protection who are subject to an enforceable transfer decision under the Dublin III Regulation. 

Citing its judgment in Haqbin (C-233/18, 12 November 2019), the court reiterated that pursuant to Article 2(f) and (g) of the recast RCD, the concept "material reception conditions" encompasses all measures taken by Member States to provide applicants for international protection with accommodation, food and clothing, provided in kind or in the form of a financial allowance or vouchers, or a combination of these three forms, as well as a daily allowance. Moreover, Article 17(2) of the recast RCD obliges Member States to ensure that the measures related to material reception conditions provide applicants with an adequate standard of living, guaranteeing their subsistence and protecting their physical and mental health.

Regarding the first question, the court noted that, in essence, the referring court sought guidance on whether Article 17(2), jointly with Article 2(g) of the recast RCD, preclude national legislation which provides that, where an application for international protection has been rejected as inadmissible because another Member State is responsible for examining that application under the Dublin III Regulation, and the transfer decision is enforceable, the material reception conditions are reduced, discontinuing the benefits provided in kind (including food, clothes, everyday household goods and consumer goods, except in specific cases) and the financial allowance intended to cover the applicant's essential personal needs.

The court clarified that the term “adequate”, as used for defining the standard of living for applicants for international protection, in relation to measures concerning “material reception conditions” means that those measures include, at the very least, the provision of accommodation, food, and clothing, either in kind or, equivalently, in the form of an allowance or vouchers, as well as the payment of a daily allowance. According to the court, these requirements constitute the minimum level to be reached in order to ensure the subsistence of applicants and to protect their physical and mental health. A failure to cover one of these measures would result in an inadequate standard of living, especially when the national system does not foresee measures related to clothing and the payment of a daily allowance. Clothing is listed among the most basic needs, on an equal footing with food and accommodation and personal care, thus an applicant for international protection cannot be deprived of the possibility of satisfying such a need. As regards the financial allowance, the court agreed with the Advocate General opinion that such an allowance provides applicants for international protection with a minimum level of autonomy and a minimum level of participation in the social and cultural life of the Member State where they reside. Hence, the absence of either food, housing, clothing or the financial allowance cannot be justified by the fact that the person is subject to an enforceable transfer decision.

Moreover, the fact of being subject to an enforceable transfer decision is not among the circumstances for which material reception conditions can be limited or withdrawn pursuant to the recast RCD and Member States cannot adopt less favourable conditions.

Therefore, the court ruled that: Article 17(2) of the recast RCD, read in conjunction with Article 2(g) thereof, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which provides that, where an application for international protection has been rejected as inadmissible because another Member State is responsible for examining that application, within the meaning of the Dublin III Regulation, and the transfer decision to that other Member State is enforceable, the material reception conditions granted to that applicant are reduced, in a way that they no longer include, in particular, benefits in kind covering clothing, everyday household goods and consumer goods, except in specific cases, nor the financial allowance intended to cover the applicant's essential personal needs.

The second question referred to the court was whether Article 20(1)(c) of the recast RCD, read in conjunction with Article 2(q) of the recast Asylum Procedures Directive (APD), must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of "subsequent application" covers also the situation in which a Member State has, on the one hand, rejected an application for international protection as inadmissible on the grounds that the applicant has already lodged such an application in another Member State, responsible for examining his application, within the meaning of the Dublin III Regulation, and, on the other hand, ordered, on that basis, the removal of that applicant with a view to his transfer to that other Member State, in accordance with that Regulation.

Referencing the judgment N.A.K. and Others v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Khan Yunis and Baabda], (C-123/23 and C-202/23, 19 December 2024), the court clarified that that case concerned a different scenario than the one in the present case. Specifically, in that case the court ruled that Article 33(2)(d) of the recast APD, read in conjunction with Article 2(q) of that directive, does not preclude a national rule which provides for the possibility of rejecting as inadmissible an application for international protection submitted to that Member State by a third-country national or a stateless person whose earlier application for international protection, submitted to another Member State to which the recast QD applies, has been rejected by a final decision taken by that latter Member State. 

However, the situation is not comparable because the question in the present case concerns the situation in which, on the one hand, the Member State concerned rejects the new application for international protection as inadmissible on the basis of the Dublin III Regulation, on the grounds that the other Member State, with which the earlier application was lodged, is responsible for examining that application, in accordance with the criteria set out in Chapter III of that Regulation, and, on the other hand, simultaneously orders the removal of that applicant with a view to his transfer to that other Member State. Therefore, a Member State cannot, by hypothesis, classify an application for international protection submitted to it as a "subsequent application" pursuant to Article 2(q) of the recast APD, nor can it apply the procedures provided for the examination of such a "subsequent application". The court found this interpretation consistent with Article 33 (1) of the recast APD, which specifies that Member States can declare applications for international protection inadmissible in certain cases which are in addition to those "in which an application is not examined pursuant to the Dublin III Regulation".

The court concluded that ‘Article 2(q) of the recast APD , to which Article 20(1)(c) of the recast RCD refers, must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of "subsequent application" does not cover the situation in which a Member State has, on the one hand, rejected an application for international protection as inadmissible on the grounds that the applicant has already lodged such an application in another Member State and, on the other hand, ordered, on that basis, the removal of that applicant with a view to his transfer to the Member State responsible for examining his application, in accordance with the Dublin III Regulation'.

Hence, in such a situation, a Member State cannot justify measures withdrawing or limiting material reception condition based on Article 2(q) of the recast APD, to which Article 20(1)(c) of the recast RCD refers, because the concept of ‘subsequent application' does not cover it.