A., a Ukrainian national, lived in Ukraine prior to the outbreak of the war. She left the country on 4 March 2022 and travelled to Germany, where she was granted temporary protection valid until 4 March 2025. Due to the absence of basic health insurance and a gynaecological condition, she subsequently travelled to Türkiye, where she remained for several months and was employed. Because of low wages and high taxes in Türkiye, she decided to seek employment in Switzerland and accordingly applied there for a status S residence permit, the Swiss equivalent to temporary protection. A. further claimed that she could not return to Germany because she had resigned from her previous employment there and, in September 2024, had received death threats from a woman. An investigation into that incident was reportedly conducted and closed in May 2025. The State Secretariat for Migration (SEM) rejected her request for status S on 10 March 2026 on the grounds that, pursuant to the principle of subsidiarity, an application for protection may be rejected when the applicant already benefits from an alternative form of protection in a third country equivalent to status S, and thus, is not dependent on Swiss protection from the war in Ukraine.

The SEM further held that this conclusion was not affected by the possible termination of the applicant's protection status in the third country following her voluntary departure from that country, provided that such protection status could be reacquired there. Based on the facts of the case, the SEM found that the applicant had voluntarily left Germany and that the German authorities would have no reason to refuse her renewed protection if she were to apply again, even though she had been temporarily absent from the country, as indicated on the website of the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF). On those grounds, SEM rejected the application and assessed that the return was enforceable, reasonable and feasible.

On appeal before the Federal Administrative Court (FAC), the applicant argued that SEM should not have limited the examination to whether it was possible to regain temporary protection status in Germany, but it should have investigated whether this was realistic and reasonable in view of the applicant's medical circumstances. She also alleged that her temporary protection residence permit was no longer valid in Germany, that there was no readmission procedure, and that the principle of subsidiarity did not apply because it could not be assumed that an alternative form of protection was available to her. 

The FAC reiterated that, although the applicant was eligible for status S, she had access to an equivalent status in Germany. It referenced its previous judgment in A. v State Secretariat for Migration (Staatssekretariat für Migration‚ SEM), (D-4601/2025, 9 February 2026) to state that EU law is based on the principle that the country which first granted protection remains in principle responsible for granting protection.

The FAC held that, even if the applicant no longer possessed a valid residence permit evidencing temporary protection status in Germany, it could nevertheless be assumed that she would be able to reacquire such status. The FAC noted that Germany is bound by EU law and that temporary protection within the European Union had been extended until 4 March 2027. Moreover, citing the CJEU judgment in Krasiliva (C-753/2023, 27 February 2025), the FAC held that the applicant's request for status S in Switzerland could not be presumed to have adverse consequences for a renewed request for temporary protection in Germany. In those circumstances, the court concluded that it had been established with sufficient certainty that Germany would again grant the applicant temporary protection and issue her with a corresponding residence permit if she returned there.

The FAC noted that the applicant held a Ukrainian passport allowing her to enter the Schengen area visa-free and travel without restrictions, and thus she could easily and legally return to Germany. Against this background, the court also clarified that SEM did not need to check whether there was a formal readmission agreement with that country.

On alleged impediments to a return to Germany, the court found that there was no indication neither in the file nor in the evidence that the applicant was likely to be exposed to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The court reiterated that Germany is a signatory of the ECHR, the Refugee Convention and generally complies with its international obligations under the international legal framework. The applicant did not present any evidence capable of rebutting the presumption of the reasonableness of the deportation order. On the contrary it held that, pursuant to Article 13 of the TPD, beneficiaries of temporary protection have access to social, medical assistance and employment, that the applicant had a good command of the German language and, since she managed to find employment and housing in Germany in the past, it could be assumed that she would be able to do that again. Concerning her alleged medical problems, the FAC noted that, according to the medical document submitted, she suffered from arterial hypertension and psychological problems, conditions that could be easily treated in Germany.  

The FAC dismissed the appeal and confirmed the negative decision on temporary protection as well as the deportation order.