M.A., an individual of Palestinian origin born in Lebanon, applied for asylum on 26 November 2015. His application was rejected by the Asylum Service on 18 April 2016, and his appeal to the Refugee Reviewing Authority was also rejected. M.A. registered a subsequent application on 28 November 2021, attaching medical evidence reporting being admitted to Nicosia General hospital and the diagnosis of a skin infection in the hand, diabetes mellitus, and insulin dependency. His subsequent application was rejected by the acting Head of the Asylum Service on 13 June 2024. The applicant submitted an appeal to the International Protection Administrative Court (IPAC) arguing that he is a Palestinian, holder of a Palestine Refugee Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) card, has no rights, there are armed conflicts in Lebanon, has no security, has health problems and cannot receive treatment in case of his return and wished to remain the Republic of Cyprus because he cannot return to Lebanon.

The court recognised at the outset that some of the applicant's allegations remained the same and, in that sense, the subsequent application was not based on a completely new factual basis. However, the court held that that was not sufficient to conclude that there was no new evidence within the meaning of Article 16Δ of the Refugee Law. The court recalled in this respect that the concept of new evidence or findings is not limited to new individual incidents of persecution which concern exclusively and personally the applicant, but it may also involve substantial changes in the objective circumstances of the country of habitual residence, provided that these are subsequent to the previous procedure and are related to the assessment of the risk that the applicant will face in the event of return. The court further noted that the applicant did not confine himself to simply repeating his earlier statements but argued during court proceedings that the situation in Lebanon had deteriorated substantially, Palestinian refugees continue to be in a particularly vulnerable position and that, in combination with the new health problems he is facing, his return now exposes him to the risk of serious harm.  

The court held that although not in themselves sufficient to consider the admissibility of a subsequent application, it was relevant that the medical facts submitted had occurred after the completion of the initial asylum procedure. In this sense, the court recalled that the correct legal approach is to examine the medical elements in combination with the other new data invoked by the applicant, such as the change in the situation in the country of return, and not in isolation.

The court noted that there was a delay of three years in deciding over the subsequent application and such delay was of particular importance in light of the health history of the applicant. The court ruled that the administration should, before forming a safe judgment, have requested and evaluated an updated picture of the applicant's state of health to ascertain the development of his condition, his current treatment needs and the gravity of his personal circumstances at the time of the decision. By having examined the medical data in isolation, the asylum service had failed in carrying out an individualised examination of the applicant's actual possibility of accessing appropriate treatment in Lebanon, the adequacy of UNRWA services in relation to their specific needs, the impact of conditions in the camps on the management of a chronic disease such as diabetes, nor the combined effect of their personal data and the deteriorating security and living situation in the country of return.

The court concluded that the substantial deterioration in Lebanon and the applicant's latest medical data were of such nature and gravity as to significantly increase the chances of his being granted subsidiary protection. In the court's view, the conditions of Article 16Δ were met and the applicant's application should not have been rejected as inadmissible.

The court concluded that the substantial deterioration in Lebanon and the applicant's latest medical data were of such nature and gravity as to significantly increase the chances of his being granted subsidiary protection. The conditions of Article 16Δ were met and the applicant's application should not have been rejected as inadmissible.

In addition, the court ruled that, the omission of due investigation by the administration not only affected the finding of inadmissibility of the subsequent application, but also the legality of the return decision. The court held that, by mentioning in the return decision that “there were no indications” of risk contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR, the administration explicitly assessed the risk of return and issued a new return decision. However, the statement of such risk was not accompanied by a specific analysis of the conditions prevailing in Lebanon at the time, nor by a substantial weighing of the Applicant's health history and his access to appropriate treatment in conditions of generalized instability and humanitarian deterioration. Therefore, the court ruled that, whilst the administration addressed the risk of return, it did so in an incomplete and unreasoned manner, exacerbating the defect of the contested decision. The court recalled that it is a well-established principle of EU law that the issuance of a return decision triggers independent obligations of the Administration, independent of the judgment on the application for international protection.

Next, the court evaluated the reasons put forward by the applicant by looking at country of origin information (COI), including EUAA's COI Report Lebanon: Country Focus (November 2025), reporting on the security situation in Lebanon after the 2024 Truce until February 2026, on recent hostilities of March-April 2026, and focusing in the region of habitual residence of the applicant, Bourj Al Barajneh, a Palestinian refugee camp located in the southern suburbs of Beirut. The court also assessed country of origin information reporting on the impact of the security situation on the civilian population and healthcare infrastructure and services. Based on the sources, the court found that the safety and living condition in Bourj Al Barajneh remained extremely burdened and unstable. The court noted that the camp, which is located in the southern suburbs of Beirut, is characterized by overcrowding, inadequate infrastructure and a high concentration of vulnerable populations, while operating under a peculiar governance regime, in addition to the full and effective expansion of state power and Lebanese criminal justice, resulting in limited access of residents to protection, security and justice mechanisms. The court found of particular importance that the southern districts of Beirut and the surrounding areas, including Bourj Al Barajneh, were directly affected by the conflict, while the general collapse of infrastructure, the jeopardy to humanitarian access, and the severe strain on medical services further exacerbate the vulnerability of the residents. Based on the above, the court concluded that  the situation at the applicant's place of return cannot be characterized as either stable or predictable, but, on the contrary, exhibits strong elements of ongoing fluidity, instability, and danger, which must be assessed in conjunction with the Applicant's individual circumstances, and in particular with his state of health, within the framework of a comprehensive and individualized assessment of the risk of serious harm in the event of return.

In light of the information assessed and the defects found, the court annulled the decision rejecting the subsequent application of the applicant, on the grounds of error of fact, and lack of proper investigation and reasoning.

Based on the Court of Justice of the European Union's Judgment in XY (C-18/20, 9 September 2021), the court recalled that its jurisdiction in the cases of subsequent applications rejected as inadmissible are limited to the legality and correctness of the admissibility judgment and do not extend to a substantive examination of the need to grant international protection.

The court ordered the asylum service to swiftly substantially examine the reasons put forward in his subsequent application.