The applicant, a Yazidi woman of Kurdish ethnicity from Armenia, requested international protection in Germany on 17 February 2015 together with her then husband and son but later withdrew it and only invoked the ban on deportation to Armenia. By decision of 4 March 2016, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) terminated the asylum procedure and found that there were no prohibitions on deportation to Armenia. The deportation to Armenia took place on 5 September 2017.

On 3 September 2019, the applicant requested international protection in France claiming that her now ex-husband returned to Armenia and threatened her with death after she tried to have contact with her child. By decision of 31 May 2021, the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA) granted the applicant subsidiary protection, finding her claims credible that in case of return to Armenia, she would be subjected to serious assaults by her ex-husband and that the Armenian authorities would not be able to sufficiently protect her. On 1 March 2023 the applicant renounced the subsidiary protection status, which the OFPRA confirmed by decision of 3 January 2025. She returned to Armenia in April 2023.

After arriving in Germany in September 2023, the applicant requested international protection thereon 5 December 2023 claiming that she was forced by her family in France to renounce her international protection there and return to Armenia, as, following her father's death, she could not live alone according to the Yazidi traditions. The applicant claimed that in Armenia she was beaten daily, her relatives tried to set her up for a forced marriage and that her brother as well as uncle threatened to kill her, which is why she had to leave Armenia again. The applicant argued that she was afraid to return to France, as she had many relatives there who might punish her as well. By decision of 20 October 2025, BAMF rejected the application as inadmissible on ground that the applicant had already been granted international protection in France. BAMF considered that although the applicant voluntarily renounced protection, that protection was still valid. It recalled that under the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) applicants cannot choose a particular Member State for the asylum procedure. The applicant appealed the decision before the Regional Administrative Court in Hamburg.

The Regional Administrative Court in Hamburg decided to stay the proceedings and to seek guidance from the CJEU by submitting the following questions for a preliminary ruling:

1. Must Article 33(2)(a) of the recast Asylum Procedures Directive (APD) be interpreted as meaning that a Member State may­ reject an application for international protection as inadmissible only if the international protection granted by the other Member State /still exists? at the relevant time for assessing the admissibility of the new application for international protection?

2. If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative: Is there an exception to that rule to be made when the applicant has renounced the international protection granted to him in another Member State? In that regard, does it depend on other circumstances, such as whether, in a reasonable assessment of all the circumstances of the individual case, the renunciation was solely made for the purpose of obtaining the possibility of successfully applying for international protection again in another Member­ State?

The Administrative Court in Hamburg also suggested an answer to the questions as follows:  “Article 33(2)(a) of Directive 2013/32/EU must be interpreted as meaning that a Member State may, at least in principle, consider an application for international protection to be inadmissible only if another Member State has not only­ granted international protection in the past, but when that protection still exists “ In the circumstances of the present case, the referring court noted that the applicant's subsidiary protection  has already ceased to exist since 1 March 2023 and the decision of the OFPRA of 3 January 2025 had  merely a declaratory nature. In any case, even if this would be assessed in a different way, the applicant's international protection would no longer have existed at the relevant time of the last hearing or the judicial decision in Germany, pursuant to Section 77 (1) of the Asylum Act (AsylG).

The Administrative Court recalled that according to the the current German case law which is also followed by the BAMF, Article 33 (2) (a) of the recast APD must be interpreted as meaning that cases in which there is a voluntary waiver of the right to asylum by a person granted international protection in another Member State must be treated in the same way as cases in which such protection continues to exist.

Furthermore, the referring court asserted that the wording of Article 33(2)(a) which refers to ‘protection' granted means that protection continues to exist and it is not sufficient that such protection was granted in the past, as basis for rejecting a new application as inadmissible. The Administrative Court noted that Recital 43 of the recast APD supports the above interpretation. Precisely, it recalled that the provision of ‘'other sufficient protection'' and the requirement to ensure readmission make it clear that the legislator in principle assumes that there is continued international protection. By contrary, the court, citing the CJEU judgment in M. and others v State Secretary for Justice and Security (Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid) (C-673/19, 24 February 2021) and Article 6(3) of the Return Directive, affirmed that, in the present case, a readmission was unlikely since protection no longer existed. The court considered that there was no other possibility for cases where international protection has ended based on an explicit waiver pursuant to a national provision implementing Article 45 (5) of the recast APD. Based on a theological interpretation and in line with the German case law, the court affirmed that, in its view, cases in which an applicant waived protection granted in another Member State must be treated in the same way as cases where protection continues to exist.

The court emphasised that Article 33(2)(a) of the recast APD implements the central objective of the Common European Asylum System which is to avoid secondary movements after international protection has been granted in one Member State. This objective would be devoid of effect if an asylum applicant could, by voluntarily renouncing his or her international protection granted to them in another Member State, be able to claim a new right for international protection in Germany, potentially driven by the sole aim of economic or personal interests.

However, the Administrative Court considered permissible under EU law to treat a renunciation of international protection granted in another Member State as if it had not taken place in certain circumstances, such as when the renunciation served the sole purpose of successfully applying for international protection in another Member State. In addition, the referring court suggested to consider resolving cases of renunciation by relying on Article 18(1)(d) of the Dublin III Regulation, thus  treating such cases as a rejection of an application for international protection and referenced the CJEU judgment in N.A.K. and Others v Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Joined Cases C-123/23 and C-202/23, 19 December 2024). In the court's view, this also aligns with German case law on second applications according to which a renunciation of the international protection granted by another Member State must be equated with an ‘'unsuccessful asylum procedure'' in that Member State ().

The referring court found that, although it is considering cases of renunciation of international protection in another Member State in certain situations as if that protection continued to exist, however it did not find this interpretation applicable in the present case. This is because it was not apparent that, upon renouncing  international protection granted to her in France, the applicant had already intended to apply for international protection again in Germany, nor that she could  be accused of any other abusive conduct.

The court held that the appeal would be unfounded if the CJEU was to answer the questions by stating that Article 33(2)(a) must be interpreted as meaning that it was sufficient that international protection was granted in the past in another Member State or that, for the purpose of Article 33(2)(a), cases in which international protection granted in another Member State was waived must be treated as if international protection continued.