The applicant, a national of the Russian Federation, applied for international protection in Czechia after several years of residence in the country and after her residence permit was not extended, claiming a risk of persecution due to her political opinion, the need for continued medical treatment for her health conditions, and interference with her private and family life in the event of return. By a decision of 24 February 2025, the Ministry of the Interior (the ministry) refused to grant international protection. The applicant challenged that decision before the Municipal Court in Prague, which upheld the ministry's decision. She then lodged a cassation complaint with the Supreme Administrative Court.
On 31 March 2026, the Supreme Administrative Court rejected the cassation complaint as inadmissible. The court agreed that the availability of medical treatment in Russia had been assessed correctly on the basis of country of origin information using the EUAA Medical Country of Origin Information (MedCOI) methodology. Referring to its own case law (6 Azs 98/2018-22) and the European Court of Human Rights' jurisprudence (Paposhvili v Belgium, No 41738/10, 13 December 2016), the court noted that a lower quality of healthcare in the country of origin could justify subsidiary protection only when it would amount to inhuman or degrading treatment, or it would create a real risk of a grave, rapid and irreversible deterioration in the person's health, leading to intense suffering or a significant reduction in life expectancy.
The Supreme Administrative Court also agreed with the Municipal Court that the applicant was unlikely to face persecution for political opinion, given that she had returned to Russia repeatedly without experiencing problems, she did not fall within the profile of persons typically targeted, and her online activity was not tied to her identity. The court also agreed that the purpose of international protection is protecting the person from inhuman or degrading treatment or serious harm in the country of origin, rather than protecting as such the right to private and family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
In conclusion, the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's cassation complaint as inadmissible.