The applicants, a mother and her minor son, requested international protection in Lithuania. The applicant's former spouse – the minor applicant's father – had engaged in political opposition activity in the country of origin, had been criminally convicted on “extremism” grounds, and had been granted refugee status in Lithuania. The applicant claimed that they divorced only formally to protect their child while living in the country of origin, that they resumed living together in Lithuania, and that they could not formalise a new marriage due to administrative obstacles. The applicant also alleged that she had herself expressed opposition views online and participated in protests, that searches, confiscations, and questioning had taken place in connection with her former spouse, and that she had been dismissed from work for politically motivated reasons. The applicant also invoked the risk that the child could be removed into state care upon return, as a means of pressure against families linked to the opposition.
The minor applicant requested to be granted refugee status without an individual merits assessment under point 109 of the Description of the Procedure for Granting and Withdrawing Asylum, because his father had already been granted refugee status in Lithuania. The Migration Department of the Ministry of the Interior rejected the request, arguing that, following the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in A.B. v Ministry of the Interior (Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky) (C-349/24), this approach was incompatible with Article 3 of the recast Qualification Directive and the minor's application had to be examined on the merits.
On 17 November 2025, the Migration Department decided that the applicants do not face danger in the country of origin and refused to grant international protection. The applicants lodged a complaint with the Regional Administrative Court, which on 3 February 2026 upheld the Migration Department's decision. The applicants appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court.
The Supreme Administrative Court allowed the appeal and annulled the first instance judgment and the Migration Department's decision as unsubstantiated and unlawful. The court found that the Migration Department had failed to properly assess the risk of persecution arising from the applicants' family ties with the former spouse/father, including whether the authorities might use the applicants to exert pressure on him once they become aware that he had been granted asylum in Lithuania. The court also held that the Migration Department placed excessive weight on the formal dissolution of the marriage in concluding that the applicants would not be treated as the former spouse/father's family members and therefore faced no threat. In particular, it found that the Department did not adequately assess the applicants' explanation that the divorce was aimed at protecting the child, the objective obstacles to re-marriage, and the fact that the Lithuanian constitutional concept of “family” is not limited only to marriage (ruling of the Constitutional Court of 28 September 2011 and judgments of the Supreme Administrative Court in A-1713-1188/2023, A-1714-415/2023, and eA-1018-1188/2025).
The court further noted that the country of origin information (COI) relied upon by the Migration Department indicated that parents' participation in protests may lead to children being taken into state custody. Given that the child's father had been criminally convicted as an “extremist”, the court considered the Department's conclusion that this risk was “purely hypothetical” to be insufficiently reasoned. The court also held that the Migration Department had not properly assessed the existing relationship of dependency between the applicant, the minor applicant, and the former spouse/father, who were living together in Lithuania, the child's dependence on caregivers, the potential impact on his physical and psychological development and well-being, and his particular vulnerability.
In conclusion, the Supreme Administrative Court allowed the applicants' appeal, annulled the Regional Administrative Court's judgment and the Migration Department's decision, and ordered the Migration Department to re-examine the applicants' request for international protection.