Asylum applicants in Belgium, some beneficiaries of international protection in another Member State (the majority in Greece) and some being first time applicants in Belgium, submitted 20 claims before the Constitutional Court on 23 and 24 October 2025, requesting the court to annul and suspend the Law of 14 July 2025 which modified the Law of 15 December 1980 on access to territory, residence, and removal of third country nationals, as well as Articles 2, 4 and 5 of the Law of 12 January 2007 on the reception of asylum applicants and other categories of aliens.
According to the Belgian legislation, asylum applicants have the right to material reception conditions, which in principle encompasses the granting of a financial allowance and of housing in a reception facility. The contested legislation of July 2025 reformed this system,allowing the Federal Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (Fedasil) to refuse the granting of a financial allowance to asylum applicants that are beneficiaries of international protection in another EU Member State. This is because an asylum application in Belgium is deemed ‘subsequent’ if introduced after a final decision was taken in another Member State on a previous asylum application, irrespective of whether the outcome was positive or not. Secondly, the contested legislation removed Fedasil’s faculty, in particular circumstances, not to assign a mandatory place of registration or to remove it, in which cases applicants were permitted to access reception under the form of a financial allowance.
The Constitutional Court proceeded to assess whether the requests for suspension met the requirements of seriousness and urgency, meaning that that the immediate application of the contested provisions risks causing them serious harm that would be difficult to remedy.
It emphasised that material reception conditions granted by public authorities constitute, for the vast majority of asylum applicants, their only possibility of leading a life consistent with human dignity during the examination of their application, thus removing material reception conditions entail a serious risk resulting in a harm which may be difficult to repair afterwards and which directly derives from the contested provisions. It found that the first measure mainly affects asylum applicants who have been granted protection in Greece, and who left that country due to living conditions breaching their right to human dignity, without them being responsible for the reasons for which they left Greece and came to Belgium.
The second measure affects first time applicants with pending applications in Belgium. Some of them could not access the reception system due to the saturation of the reception network, while others reside in private accommodations with relatives who are legal residents in Belgium, and lastly, some others are housed in a reception center managed by Fedasil, but contested the adequacy of their housing on account of their health situation. Consequently, the Constitutional Court affirmed that the suppression of the possibility to access a financial allowance can cause a serious and irreparable harm to different applicants.
The applicants in this case complained that the contested provisions breach Articles 10 and 11 of the Belgian Constitution (principle of equality and non-discrimination), Article 33 of the recast Asylum Procedures Directive (APD) and Article 20 of the recast Reception Conditions Directive (RCD). They criticise that the first measure puts on equal foot applicants whose asylum applications were rejected in the other Member State and those who have been granted protection in that other Member State, holding that an application submitted by beneficiaries of international protection cannot be qualified as ‘subsequent application’ under EU law, and consequently the persons concerned cannot be deprived of material reception conditions.
The Constitutional Court underlined that Article 20 of the recast RCD comprises an exhaustive list of situations where material reception conditions can be refused by a Member State to an asylum applicant, specifically when an asylum application constitutes a subsequent application within the meaning of the recast APD.
In such context, the court casted a doubt on whether an asylum application introduced after an applicant has been granted or rejected protection in another Member State can be considered as ‘subsequent application’ and whether Belgium can consequently refuse the granting of material reception conditions to that person. Since the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has not yet ruled on this matter, the Constitutional Court decided to stay the proceedings and to seek guidance from the CJEU. In such circumstances, the referring court affirmed that the requirement of seriousness of the request was met.
On the second measure, the applicants alleged that these provisions may lead to a breach of the right to human dignity, enshrined under Article 23 of the Constitution, as well as previously mentioned Articles 10 and 11 of the Constitution, read in conjunction with the European Convention on Human Rights, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EU Charter) and the right to private and family life.
While the court acknowledged that the recast RCD provides Member States with a margin of discretion in determining the material reception conditions for asylum applicants, and that the legislature may decide, in order to discourage a high influx of applicants, that the only form of reception is accommodation in a reception facility. However, when there are no places in the reception facilities due to a saturation of the system and no other form of material assistance is available, or when the conditions are inadequate for applicants with special needs, then the impossibility to be granted a financial allowance entails a risk of substantially breaching the right to respect of human dignity.
In addition, the court found that the contested provisions seem contrary to Article 22 of the Constitution insofar as they prevent the granting of a financial allowance and can, in particular circumstances, interfere with the right to private and family life.
The court concluded that EU law does not provide an answer to whether this legislation and practice is compliant with the CEAS, and decided to suspend the proceedings and to refer the following question before the CJEU for a preliminary ruling.
Are Article 33 of the recast APD and Articles 3, 19 and 55(2) of the Regulation 2024/1348 establishing a common procedure for international protection in the Union and repealing Directive 2013/32/EU to be interpreted as allowing to treat applications lodged in a second Member State after a first Member State has granted international protection to the applicant as subsequent applications and, consequently, to limit or withdraw the benefit of material reception conditions with regard to that applicant on the basis of Article 20(1)(c) of the RCD?