A Syrian national requested the Regional Administrative Court of Düsseldorf to order the suspensive effect of his appeal lodged against the return order contained in the BAMF negative decision on asylum of 16 October 2025. The court reiterated that a request for suspensive effect of appeal can be allowed only when there are serious doubts concerning the legality of the contested act or violation of the applicant’s rights. The court found that the conditions were not met in this case because the asylum application was correctly rejected as inadmissible and the threat to deportation was lawful.

First, the court noted that the applicant unsuccessfully applied for international asylum in Austria and then he sought asylum in Germany. The court affirmed that if, after the unsuccessful conclusion of an asylum procedure in a safe third country (Section 26a of the Asylum Act), a third country national submits an asylum application (subsequent application) in Germany, a further asylum procedure is only to be carried out if the Germany is responsible for conducting the asylum procedure and the requirements of Section 51 (1-3) of the Administrative Procedure Act are met.

The court noted that Section 71a of the Asylum Act is in line with EU law, especially the ground for inadmissibility concerning the rejection of subsequent applications, as laid down in Article 33(2)(d) in conjunction with Article 2(q) of the recast Asylum Procedures Directive. Citing the CJEU judgment in N.A.K. and Others v Bundesrepublik Deutschland (joined Cases C-123/23 and C-202/23, 19 December 2024), the court held that an application can be rejected as inadmissible when, after receiving a final negative decision on a previous application in a first Member State, the person applies again for international protection in a different Member State.

Also, a subsequent application can only be rejected as inadmissible under Sections 29(1)(5) and 71a of the Asylum Act if the asylum procedure previously conducted in the other Member State was carried out in accordance with the Geneva Refugee Convention and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Since the applicant did not argue deficiencies in the procedure conducted in Austria, then this requirement was not met.

The court further noted that Section 51 (1) of the Administrative Procedure Act requires the authority, upon application by the person concerned, to reopen the proceedings if the factual or legal situation in the administrative act has subsequently changed in favour of the applicant, if new available evidence would have led to a more favourable outcome, or grounds for reopening exist in accordance with Section 580 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In addition, the application is only admissible if the applicant was unable, through no gross negligence, to assert the grounds for reopening in the earlier proceedings, particularly through an appeal.

The court asserted that the prerequisites for reopening the proceedings were not met because there was no change in the situation since the negative decision issued by the Austrian authorities on 19 October 2023.

In the absence of new grounds concerning Syria, the court noted that a repetition of the grounds already asserted and assessed by the Austrian Federal Office were not capable of triggering a new procedure in Germany or a reopening as no new elements were raised and no change in the situation was substantiated in order to support, with a high degree of probability, a more favourable decision. The court also cited the CJEU judgment A.A. v Federal Republic of Germany (C-216/22, 8 February 2024) on new elements or findings to support a subsequent application.

The court further assessed that the conditions for being granted were not met in the case and referenced the CJEU case EZ v Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Federal Republic of Germany) (C-238/19, 19 November 2020) as well as national jurisprudence to rule that the applicant did not demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecutions on grounds of military service because the applicant’s allegations related more to the Assad regime which no longer exercises power in Syrian since 8 December 2024.

After reviewing updated country of origin information, also by referencing EUAA, Syria: Country Focus, July 2025, the court noted that after the fall of Assad’s regime the security situation improved in general and concluded that there were no indications of a risk of serious harm or a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment upon return. It could not be established that every Syrian, in the event of return, is at considerable risk of facing a situation of distress. It stated that there were no reasons to believe, with a considerable degree of probability, that the applicant would be at risk of a serious individual threat to life or physical integrity in Syria because of indiscriminate violence in the context of an international or internal armed conflict, pursuant to Section 4(1) sentence 1, 2 no. 3 of the Asylum Act. The court noted that if the applicant lived with his father either in Damascus or in the province of Latakia since his birth in 2006 (place of birth Latakia), the level of arbitrary violence that region and its province, is not so high that he would be exposed to a serious individual threat to his life or physical integrity solely by virtue of his presence there.

The court further assessed that there were no reasons to prohibit deportation of the applicant and found that Germany would not violate its obligations under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in case it returns the applicant to Syria. According to the ECtHR case law, for example Soering v. United Kingdom (No 14038/88, 7 July 1998), J.K. and others v Sweden (No 59166/12, 23 August 2016) the poor socio-economic and humanitarian conditions in the destination country can also justify a prohibition of deportation under Article 3 of the ECHR, in exceptional cases and under stricter standards.

In the assessment on the risk of inhuman or degrading treatment upon return, the court also held that if the returnee can access assistance that precludes a situation where the applicant cannot secure basic needs within a foreseeable period, protection from deportation can only be granted in exceptional cases if, at the relevant time of assessment, it can already be assumed that the applicant is highly likely to face material deprivation within a short timeframe after exhausting the return assistance. According to the court, the longer the period of subsistence covered by return assistance, the higher the probability of material deprivation after this period must be.

The court took note of the return assistance measures as detailed by the BAMF in the contested decision, for example the REAG/GARP program launched in January 2025, possible special payments, travel allowances and start-up assistance, as well as the general  medical support and the National Reintegration Program Syria (EURP SYR) launched in February 2025, which provides both short-term (“Post Arrival Package”) and long-term (“Post Return Package”) assistance on the ground. As such, the applicant was presumed to be able to meet his most basic needs for a foreseeable period after his return, despite the humanitarian situation in Syria

In view of his individual circumstances, the court noted that the applicant would not be in a situation of material deprivation because he is well-skilled, knows the local language, it can be assumed that he is familiar with the local custom and he also has relatives in Syria and Lebanon, thus allowing him to establish a family network. He presented no significant health condition or other circumstances to substantiate an extreme risk of material deprivation upon return.

The court also dismissed claims related to interim measures adopted by the ECtHR as it found that latter stated in A.F. v Austria (24394/25, 23 September 2025) that in view of the general security situation in Syria and the individual circumstances of the case, it could not be proven that the applicant would face a real and imminent risk of irreparable harm if returned.

Moreover, the applicant did not display a health condition amounting to the high threshold of Article 3 applicable to expulsion of seriously ill foreigners, as in Paposhvili v Belgium (No 41738/10, 13 December 2016).

Based on the abovementioned reasons, the court rejected the request for suspensive effect of the negative decision and return.