The applicants (parents and their minor child), applied for international protection on 19 November 2023 in the Netherlands. The Dutch Minister for Asylum and Migration refused to process their applications by decision of 15 April 2024, as France was deemed responsible for their applications under Article 18(1)(b) of the Dublin III Regulation. During the registration interview, the applicants raised complaints regarding their past experience in France, where they were not granted access to reception and had to sleep in a tent on the street. They stated that they did not receive support with medical problems, nor any help from the police or from an aid organisation which they contacted. The minister issued an intention to the applicants on 12 February 2024 to inform them that their applications would not be processed in the Netherlands. However, while the minister referenced objections to the transfer in general terms and used standard text blocks to outline the assessment framework, she did not specify what those objections were or explain why the applicants' individual circumstances did not warrant a different decision. These individual circumstances and the applicants' further arguments were addressed instead in the final decision wherein the minister explained why they did not alter the outcome. The applicants appealed the decision before the District Court of the Hague, seated in Amsterdam. 

The district court upheld the appeal on 3 June 2024. It considered that that the minister acted negligently by failing to address the applicants' individual circumstances in the intention phase. The court emphasized that, based on the explanatory memorandum to the general revision of the Aliens Act 2000 and the legislative history of the Aliens Decree 2000, the intention procedure exists to ensure that both parties' positions are clearly presented before the court, especially since the objection phase was abolished for asylum cases. The court further added that the intention must be reasoned and tailored to the individual's situation, to allow the applicant to understand the proposed decision and respond substantively . Although these rules were designed for asylum rejections, the court held that the same principles apply to Dublin cases. The court found that, by using the current working method,  the minister denied both the applicants and herself the chance for a proper exchange of views on the facts in the Dublin procedure. 

The minister appealed this decision before the Council of State, whichupheld the appeal. 

The council held that in accordance with its previous case law, the minister did not act negligently by first elaborating on individual circumstances in the final decision, as long as all essential supporting considerations were included in the intention. The council confirmed that the purpose of the intention procedure is to allow an applicant to provide substantive arguments to contest the minister's intended position earlier than in the appeal phase, thereby ensuring that the final decision is well-reasoned. The council added that the intention procedure also contributes to gathering the necessary knowledge of the relevant facts and interests to be weighed, aiming to obtain a better decision through an exchange of views on the specific circumstances of the case beforehand. However, the council clarified that this does not imply that the minister is required to explicitly address all individual circumstances raised by the applicant in the intention. 

The council rejected the district court's reliance on legislative history of Articles 3.115 to 3.119 of the Aliens Decree 2000, noting that these provisions only apply to regular asylum procedures, not to Dublin cases, which are governed by Article 3.109c. The council pointed out that the underlying rationale for introducing the intention procedure in Dublin cases is clearly outlined in the explanatory memorandum to the decree amending the Aliens Decree 2000, dated 10 July 2015. The memorandum specifically indicates that the goal of the intention procedure is to determine which Member State is responsible for processing the asylum application. Given the emphasis on the independent nature of the Dublin procedure in the legislative history of Article 3.109c of the Aliens Decree 2000, the council found that applying the legislative history of Articles 3.115 to 3.118 of the Aliens Decree 2000 by analogy to the Dublin procedure was not straightforward. Additionally, the council held that the legislative history of Article 3.109c of the Aliens Decree 2000 provides no basis for considering it negligent if the minister does not address in the intention all individual circumstances raised by an applicant.  

The court clarified that all supporting considerations must be included in the intention, requiring the minister to clearly substantiate why, and on what grounds, another Member State is responsible for examining the asylum application. In the present case, the council found that the intentions included all the supporting considerations necessary to hold France responsible for the processing of the asylum application, as well as for addressing the objections raised by the applicants during the registration interviews and in their written opinions.  Since the applicants' specific circumstances were addressed adequately in the final decisions, and no new facts or reconsideration of known facts arose after the intentions were issued, the council concluded that the minister was not required to issue new intentions under Article 3.119(bb) of the Aliens Decree 2000. 

The council disagreed with the district court's view that not addressing individual circumstances in the intention phase removes the opportunity to exchange views in the Dublin procedure. While it acknowledged that it may be harder to defend against such an intention in which individual circumstances have not been clearly addressed, the council held that this does not violate the right to defence. The council noted that the intention must include all supporting reasons, including a stance on whether individual circumstances prevent transfer to which the applicant can then respond effectively during the administrative phase. The council found that the minister did address the applicants' individual circumstances in the final decisions, and the applicants could present their views on appeal. The council thus ruled that the overall decision-making process was conducted in a careful manner. 

Following this, the council upheld the minister's position that the principle of mutual trust could be relied upon with respect to Dublin transfers to France. Hereto, the council considered that in the decision, the minister had addressed the applicants' concerns about alleged systemic failures in the French asylum and reception system. Specifically, the minister referenced the 2022 Update AIDA Country Report: France and the observations of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination of December 2022 cited in that report, as well as and the AIDA Country Report on France – 2023 Update, and case law from the Dutch Council of State. The council concluded that while the issues concerning reception in France were acknowledged, they did not meet the high threshold of seriousness needed to establish a real risk of violation of Article 3 of the ECHR or Article 4 of the EU Charter as set out by the CJEU in its judgment in Abubacarr Jawo v Bundesrepublik Deutschland (C163/17, 19 March 2019). The council held that the minister had provided a sufficiently reasoned explanation for reaching a different assessment of the circumstances put forward by the applicants and the facts drawn from objective information regarding reception conditions in France. In this regard, the council referred its judgment in Applicant v The Minister for Asylum and Migration (202402084/1/V3, 4 September 2024), which outlined the assessment framework for the allocation of the burden of proof in the context of the interstate principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, as developed in response to the CJEU judgment in X v State Secretary for Justice and Security (C-392/22, 29 February 2024). 

On the issue of individual risk, the council ruled that the applicants failed to demonstrate that their past negative experiences in France or their current vulnerabilities created a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment in the event of a Dublin transfer to France. The council upheld the findings of the minister that the applicants did not wait for the asylum procedure in France, and that the French authorities guaranteed that their application would be processed in accordance with the European directives. Furthermore, the minister considered that the applicants had not provided documentary evidence that they have pursued complaints in France and had not shown that doing so would have been futile. In this regard, the council found the applicant's claim that they contacted the police and an aid organisation to be insufficient.  

The council also observed that the minister had addressed the medical situation of one of the applicants, specifically regarding her pregnancy and whether she had access to the necessary prenatal care. In particular, the council noted the minister's assessment that the fact that one of the applicants was pregnant did result in a vulnerability; however, it did not rise to the level of requiring 'special protection' within the meaning of the ECtHR judgment in Tarakhel v Switzerland (Application no. 29217/12, 4 November 2014). . The minister argued that, apart from ultrasound images and the pregnancy certificate, the applicants had not submitted any medical documents showing that there was, at that time, a need for special care or medical facilities, or that such care was unavailable in France. Additionally, the minister noted that Articles 31 and 32 of the Dublin III Regulation provide safeguards for the transfers of applicants with medical condition to be carried out diligently. The minister specified that the medical care facilities available in the Netherlands were also available in France, and that the applicant, as a pregnant woman, could request medical assistance in France. Finally, the council observed that, on appeal, the minister also cited the 2022 Update AIDA Country Report: France, which outlines the procedure followed by authorities to determine whether an asylum seeker is vulnerable and has special reception needs, with particular attention given to pregnant women. The minister also referred to the Information on procedural elements and rights of applicants subject to a Dublin transfer to France (17 April 2023) drawn up by the EUAA, which specifies that maternity care is considered urgent care, and that asylum seekers in France have access to it during the first three months of their stay. 

In light of the above, the council deemed the appeal well-founded and annulled the judgment of the District Court. However, since the time limit for the Dublin transfer of the applicants had elapsed, the minister was required to process the asylum applications. As a result, the council ruled that the appeal was inadmissible.