The applicant, Iraqi national, had been rejected international protection and submitted a subsequent application, based on his conversion to Christianity as new ground for protection. The applicant has been heard both before the FIS and the Administrative Court, which both considered his allegations on conversion not credible and also that he would not be at risk of persecution when returned to his country of origin due to his religious beliefs.
The applicant contested the negative outcome of his subsequent application, and the Supreme Administrative Court assessed the conviction of the applicant as a ground for asylum in a situation where he had been involved in religious activities in Finland for a long time, and the risk of persecution in case of return to his home country.
The Supreme Administrative Court consulted and referred to the CJEU case law, namely Joined Cases Y and Z (C-71/11 and C-99/11), judgement of 5 September 2012 and Bahtiyar Fathi (Iranian) v Chairman of the Bulgarian State Agency for Refugees (BG, Predsedatel na Darzhavna agentsia za bezhantsite), C-56/17, 4 October 2018.
The Supreme Administrative Court noted on the CJEU case law that applications for international protection based on fear of persecution on religious grounds must take into account not only the applicant's status and personal circumstances but also his or her religious beliefs and circumstances, how he understands and lives his faith, his relationship with the doctrines, rituals or regulations of the religion to which he declares that he belongs or from which he intends to distance himself, and the interaction between religious and identity, ethnic or gender factors.
According to the Supreme Administrative Court, the applicant's own account therefore plays a key role in assessing the existence of a religious belief. The Court had to assess the applicant's motivation to turn to Christianity, what effect the turn has had on the person's life. In addition to this, the overall assessment must give due weight to other evidence, such as documentary evidence and witness statements, which may support the applicant’s own statement of his conviction. However, the Supreme Court mentioned that it is not possible to assess the authenticity of the applicant’s conviction solely on the basis of such other evidence.
The Supreme Administrative Court stated that the importance of witnesses statements at the hearing must be assessed on a case-by-case basis and this assessment may focus on, among other things, how closely and for how long the witness has known the applicant, the extent to which the witness has observed his or her religion or conversion process and its various stages, whether the witness and the applicant discussed religious issues and whether the witness and the applicant are sharing a common language and understanding.
The Court noted that the applicant had been involved in the activities of the parish for about four years, prior to the hearing before the administrative court and church affiliation is one basic element of the Christian faith. However, since open activities are organised also for non-Christians, the participation in such activities does not prove by itself the existence of conviction. For such activities to demonstrate conviction, the credibility assessment must include, inter alia, the content of the activity, the applicant's own initiative, the long-term participation and other factors.
The Supreme Administrative Court held that although A's conversion to Christianity may have been formal at first and may have been intended to promote asylum, however, since a conversion to Christianity and Christian beliefs are not permanent and unchanging, but a gradual and evolving process, it was possible that Christianity had later developed into a personal belief, despite a purposeful conversion. The applicant had been actively practicing Christianity for several years and the circumstances of the early stages of the conversion should not have been given much weight in the assessment, but more of the current state of A's convictions should have been primarily assessed by lower court and FIS.
The Supreme Administrative Court considered that A's account of his personal convictions and their significance to him to be sufficiently personal and consistent as well as supported by his long-term, self-initiated, and active participation in church activities, facts corroborated with the testimonies of witnesses heard before the court.
The Supreme Administrative Court considered that it has been established with sufficient certainty that A had developed a Christian conviction which required him to practice and profess Christianity openly and that A. could not be required to live contrary to his beliefs or to conceal his beliefs in order to avoid persecution. For these reasons, the Supreme Administrative Court overturned lower court and FIS decision and referred the case back to FIS for the applicant to be granted asylum status.